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THE SUBVERSION OF THE
HEARSAY RULE: THE
RESIDUAL HEARSAY
EXCEPTIONS,
CIRCUMSTANTIAL
GUARANTEES OF
TRUSTWORTHINESS, AND
GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
Randolph N. Jonakait*
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is generally prohibited, being ad-
mitted only when it falls within a limited class of specific hearsay exceptions. Two
general hearsay exceptions were, however, engrafted onto the list of specific ones to
allow the courts to confront new and unforseen hearsay problem Lower courts have
interpreted these "residual" or "catchall" exceptions differently.
This Article analyzes judicial interpretations of the residual exceptions in cases
considering the admissibility of grandjury testimony. The author initially discusses
the traditional hearsay approach and reviews the legislative history of the residual
exceptions. He then analyzes Fourth Circuit cases considering the admissibility of
grand jury testimony, maintaining that the corroboration approach to the residual
exceptions foreshadows a greatly changed hearsay structure. The author proposes
standards for interpreting the residual hearsay exceptions' equivalent circumstantial
guarantee of trustworthiness requirement and concludes by applying it to the grand
jury cases
INTRODUCTION
WIGMORE CALLED THE rule against hearsay "that most
characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence-a
rule which may be esteemed, next to jury trial, the greatest contri-
bution of that eminently practical legal system to the world's
method of procedure."' Esteemed or not, the hearsay rule is so cen-
tral to the American evidentiary system that a basic change in the
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Princeton University (1967); J.D.,
University of Chicago (1970); LL.M., New York Law School (1971).
1. 5 J. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 1364, at 28 (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1974).
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treatment of hearsay would fundamentally alter our evidence law.2
The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence considered mak-
ing drastic alterations to the common law approach to hearsay but
decided instead that the Rules should incorporate the traditional
framework. Under the Rules, hearsay is generally prohibited and is
admitted only when it falls within a limited class of statements ex-
cepted from the hearsay prohibition.
The drafters, however, engrafted two general hearsay exceptions
onto the list of specific ones. 3 The lower courts have produced di-
verse interpretations of these "residual" or "catchall" exceptions,
4
and the Supreme Court has not yet considered them.5 Proper inter-
pretation of these controversial provisions is crucial to evidence
law.6 Since the residual exceptions allow the courts to confront new
and unforeseen hearsay problems,7 "[t]he future of hearsay is inex-
tricably linked with the way that courts interpret the residual
exceptions." 8
This Article analyzes judicial interpretations of the residual ex-
ceptions in cases that have considered the admissibility of grand
jury testimony under a residual provision. This analysis shows that
a dominant approach to the residual hearsay exceptions foreshad-
ows a greatly changed evidentiary system. This Article first ex-
plains the traditional approach to hearsay embodied in the Federal
Rules of Evidence and reviews the legislative history of the catchall
2. "Some have argued that the hearsay rule, on balance, hinders rather than contrib-
utes to the practical resolution of legal disputes, but all would acknowledge the centrality of
the hearsay rule to the American system of evidence law." R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A
MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 347 (2d ed. 1982).
3. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5).
4. After surveying decisions applying the catchall exceptions, the Litigation Section of
the American Bar Association concluded that "[t]hese diverse decisions strongly suggest the
need for greater uniformity in the application of the residual exceptions." Joseph, Emerging
Problems Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1983 A.B.A. SEC. LIT. 290. See also R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 502 ("Although the appellate courts have ad-
dressed issues on a case by case basis, no circuit has laid down a coherent framework to guide
trial judges in their exercise of discretion.").
5. "The Supreme Court has had opportunities to cast some light on the residual excep-
tions, but it has chosen not to do so." R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 504.
6. "Congress clearly intended that the residual exceptions be used cautiously. In fact,
however, they have been the focal point of considerable judicial activism, a trend which has
been met with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Joseph, supra note 4, at 279-80 (footnotes
omitted).
7. Each residual exception "not only accommodates previously unencountered, unfore-
seen situations, but also helps courts identify circumstances in which the creation of a new
exception might be justified." G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 78, at 273 (1978).
8. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 504.
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exceptions. It then discusses and analyzes the Fourth Circuit cases
considering the admissibility of grand jury testimony under the
residual exceptions.9 Examination of these cases demonstrates that
the Fourth Circuit Courts interpreting the residual exceptions are
not only stretching the boundaries of the specific exceptions, but are
replacing the traditional hearsay structure with one explicitly re-
jected by the Rules' drafters. 10 As a result, the fundamental hear-
say framework adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence is being
subverted. The Article recommends an interpretation of the
residual exceptions which allows for growth and development of the
hearsay doctrine consistent with the Rules' structure. It concludes
by applying this interpretation of the residual exceptions to the
grand jury cases.
I. THE TRADITIONAL HEARSAY FRAMEWORK EMBODIED IN
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
To credit an assertion, the trier of fact must draw inferences
about the asserter. The trier must first infer that he and the declar-
ant share the same understanding of the assertion's words. The as-
sertion must not be ambiguous. If it is, the trier must have a way of
determining what the asserter meant. The trier must also conclude
that the assertion was not an attempt to deceive--that the asserter
sincerely believed what was said. If the trier decides that he under-
stands the assertion and that it was sincere, he must determine
9. These rulings have been selected for a number of reasons. First, this has been an
area of specific dispute. Professor Michael H. Graham has commented that "An area of
particular controversy has emerged under Rule 804(b)(5) concerning the admissibility of
grand jury testimony of a witness unavailable for any of the reasons specified in Rule 804(a)."
M. GRAHAM, EVIDENCE: TEXT, RULES, ILLUSTRATIONS AND PROBLEMS 276-77 (1983).
Second, courts have split over how to treat this problem. See, eg., McKethan v. United
States, 439 U.S. 936, 939 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (summariz-
ing the split in interpretation between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits). Third, grand jury
testimony provides a strong litmus for examining the proper interpretation of the residual
exceptions, since the Federal Rules of Evidence strongly indicate that grand jury testimony is
seldom to be admitted. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). Fourth, the Litigation Section of the
American Bar Association has recently called for the Supreme Court to clarify when grand
jury testimony can be admitted under a residual exception. Joseph, supra note 4, at 291 ("At
some point the Supreme Court may find it desirable to indicate the scope of the residual
exception in cases raising issues that appear to arise with some frequency-e.g., the admissi-
bility of grand jury testimony of a witness not present and subject to cross-examination at
trial."). See also Note, Residual Hearsay Exceptions Are They Really Trustworthy?, 44
BROOKLYN L. REv. 1125, 1147 (1978) (urging trial court restraint in admitting evidence
under the residual exceptions until the Supreme Court clarifies their proper interpretation).
10. "There is some reason to believe that certain appellate decisions have too quickly
stretched the rules to protect trial court rulings that would have been difficult to justify under
specific hearsay exceptions." Joseph, supra note 4, at 290-91.
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whether that understandable, sincere statement mirrored reality.
To do that, the trier must also infer that the assertion was neither
the product of a faulty memory nor the result of a flawed percep-
tion. To credit an assertion, then, the trier must resolve these four
issues: ambiguity, sincerity, perception, and memory.11
When the assertion is made in court, the trier makes these as-
sessments with information in addition to the words of the declar-
ant. An oath is given to the witness and the trier of fact observes
his demeanor. Cross-examination, however, is the most potent
source of information about the assertion's worth. The declarant's
adversary has a motive to explore ambiguities in the statement, to
expose insincerity, reveal a flawed memory, or uncover a faulty
perception.12
The rule against hearsay is inextricably linked with the belief
that cross-examination can demonstrate the debilities of an asser-
tion.13 When an assertion is hearsay, it is not subject to contempo-
raneous cross-examination in front of the trier of fact. 14 Hearsay is
barred because the trier is unable to properly evaluate the hearsay
assertions. 15
11. See Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957 (1974) (thorough discus-
sion of inferential processes); see also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 350-52
(brief but excellent discussion of inferences).
12. The right to cross-examine is of the greatest importance to the integrity of the
factfinding process. . .. Blunt though it may be for the discovery of subconscious
distortion, cross-examination is the principle [sic] legal instrument for testing the
accuracy of a witness's perception, memory, and communication. By means of
cross-examination the witness may be required to explain ambiguous, unclear, or
inconsistent testimony; personality traits that influence cognitive functioning may
be disclosed; the effect of the witness's mental set at the time of perception, possible
suggestive influences, and numerous other factors which affect a witness's mental
processes may be investigated. . .. Cross-examination. . . may disclose deliber-
ate testimonial falsification.
Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 22. See also J. MAQUIRE, EVIDENCE:
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 17-18 (1947) ("Cross-examination tests what legal
commentators are prone to term human testimonial qualities-(1) willingness, and (2) ability,
to tell or otherwise convey the truth about the subject matter of inquiry.").
13. "Emphasis on the basis of the hearsay rule today tends to center upon the condition
of cross-examination. . . . The belief, or perhaps hope, that cross-examination is effective in
exposing imperfections of perception, memory, and narration is fundamental." FED. IL
EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee introductory note. Imperfections in perception, mem-
ory, narration and sincerity are often called the "hearsay dangers." See, eg., Wellborn, The
Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 TEx. L. REv. 49, 53 (1982).
14. FED. R. EVID. 801(c) contains the basic hearsay definition: "a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted."
15. The assumption underlying the hearsay rule is that cross-examination reveals
these potential defects in a declarant's statements; accordingly, the lack of cross-
examination is the fundamental reason for excluding hearsay evidence. Although
[Vol. 36.431
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The hearsay prohibition is far from absolute; exceptions to the
rule abound. 16 Although no single reason explains all of the excep-
tions, 17 the necessity and reliability of some hearsay justifies its ad-
missibility despite the general bar.1
8
These exceptions have become rules in themselves.19 Under the
traditional framework, the admission of hearsay is not left to the
discretion of the trial court, even if the judge in a particular case
believes that the hearsay is necessary or reliable.20 Instead, the ex-
ceptions specifically define classes of hearsay that may be admit-
ted.21 The hearsay proponent must convince the judge that the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement satisfy the
elements of an exception; otherwise, the hearsay is barred.22
Widespread criticism of the hearsay rule has prompted propos-
als for fundamental changes.23 After considering various sugges-
other reasons for rejecting hearsay have been advanced (for example, that the de-
clarant did not speak under oath and his demeanor could not be observed by the
factfinder), there now is consensus that it is the untested nature of hearsay evidence
that justifies its exclusion. This rationale, of course, is consistent with a major tenet
of the adversary system: cross-examination is essential for ensuring accuracy and
discovering truth.
G. LILLY, supra note 7, at 159-60; see also Graham, "Stickperson Hearsay':" A Simplified
Approach to Understanding the Rule Against Hearsay, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 887, 888 ("When
the statement is hearsay, the trier of fact is not in a position to assess the proper weight to be
accorded the out-of-court statement. ... ).
16. The Federal Rules of Evidence contain 27 specific exceptions to the hearsay rule.
FED. R. EvID. 803 and 804.
17. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 382.
18. Wigmore advanced the idea "that the great principle underlying the [hearsay] excep-
tions were [niecessity and [c]ircumstantial [g]uarantees of [t]rustworthiness. We have been
using the first of those terms and have made only an unsubstantial change in substituting
'reliability' for the second." J. MAQUIRE, supra note 12, at 147; see also R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 355 ("The guiding principle behind most common law [hearsay]
exceptions embod[ies] two criteria, necessity and reliability.") (emphasis added).
19. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 382 ("The hearsay exceptions
are really rules in themselves, rules which specify the situations in which hearsay statements
are admissible for all relevant purposes.").
20. "In the American legal system hearsay is not routinely admitted, nor is the decision
to admit hearsay left to the discretion of the judge." Id. at 355.
21. In summarizing the traditional reasons given for the hearsay exceptions, Judge
Weinstein stated: "It should be emphasized that Wigmore's rationale-as well as that of
most cases-makes admissible a class of hearsay rather than particular hearsay for which, in
the circumstances of the cases, there is need and assurance of reliability." Weinstein, Proba-
tive Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. Rav. 331, 337 (1961).
22. "A hearsay statement is inadmissible unless it falls within one of the exceptions to
the rule barring the admission of hearsay." M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 73.
23. "The most common criticisms have been that the exclusion of hearsay evidence
hampers the search for truth too often to be tolerated in a rational system of evidence law and
that the proliferation of hearsay exceptions has created a system of unnecessary and unman-
ageable complexity." R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 497. Weinstein has
stated that the hearsay rules "exclude evidence that has a higher probative value than evi-
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tions, however, the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence
retained the traditional approach.24  Under the Rules, hearsay is
dence they admit. They fail to provide adequate.procedural devices to minimize the possibil-
ity of misjudging the probative force of hearsay admitted." Weinstein, supra note 23, at 331.
24. The retention of the traditional framework is demonstrated in Rule 802: "Hearsay
is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." FED. R. EVID. 802.
Consequently, "the structure of the hearsay article of the Federal Rules is not substantially
different from that of the common law hearsay doctrine." Wellborn, supra note 15, at 55.
Furthermore, the Advisory Committee specified that the traditional framework was being
adopted. See FED. R. EvID. Art. VIII advisory committee introductory note ("The approach
to hearsay in these rules is that of the common law, i.e., a general rule excluding hearsay,
with exceptions under which the evidence is not required to be excluded even though hear-
say."). The Committee also refused to abandon "the system of class exceptions in favor of
individual treatment in the setting of the particular case, accompanied by procedural safe-
guards. . ." Id.
The Committee noted that "[a]bolition of the hearsay rule would be the simplest solu-
tion," but concluded that it had "been unconvinced of the wisdom of abandoning the tradi-
tional requirement of some particular assurance of credibility as a condition precedent to
admitting the hearsay declaration of an unavailable declarant." Id. The case-by-case ap-
proach had been, according to the Committee, "impressively advocated" by Judge Weinstein.
Id. (citing Weinstein, supra note 23). Since the residual exceptions, viewed in isolation, seem
to embody the principles of Weinstein's position, a more complete understanding of the re-
jected proposal is useful. In the article cited by the Committee, Weinstein contends that "it
would seem desirable to abandon the class exception system and substitute individual treat-
ment if such a practice were to be combined with advance notice to the opponent when
hearsay was to be introduced. Hearsay would then be admissible when it met the usual
standard of any line of proof." Weinstein, supra note 23, at 338. Hearsay would be admissi-
ble not when its surrounding circumstances satisfied the elements of a hearsay exception;
instead, in each case, the trial judge would determine admissibility by weighing the probative
force of the hearsay against the possibility of prejudice. Id at 338. Weinstein contended that
the traditional exceptions could give guidance for this assessment. "The circumstantial proof
of credibility which gave rise to the class exception may continue to be utilized in the particu-
lar case in assessing probative force." Id. at 339.
Weinstein's position was no doubt thoroughly considered by the Advisory Committee
since he was a member of it. 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 15 (3d ed. 1985) (listing the Advisory Committee members). The Committee's rejection
indicates that the Federal Rules of Evidence were not intended to authorize the admission of
hearsay whenever the trial judge believed it or determined that the probative value of the
hearsay outweighed its prejudicial effect.
The Rules' history also shows an acceptance of the traditional common law hearsay
framework. The preliminary draft of the Rules proposed a framework that was a sharp de-
parture from the traditional scheme, being much like Weinstein's proposal. It contained only
two exceptions, each admitting hearsay not because it fell within a specifically defined excep-
tion, but because the trial judge determined that the hearsay was reliable. The text of the first
proposed rule read: "A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its nature and the
special circumstances under which it was made offer assurances of accuracy not likely to be
enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness, even though he is available." FED. R. EVID.
8-03(a) (Prelim. Draft), 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 (1969). The second exception read: "[a] state-
ment is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its nature and the special circumstances under
which it was made offer strong assurances of accuracy and the declarant is unavailable as a
witness." Id. at 377.
The traditional exceptions only served as "illustrations" of the type of hearsay that satis-
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generally prohibited unless it falls within a defined exception.
Two residual hearsay exceptions are included in the current
Rules, and these provisions seem to embody a nontraditional ap-
proach to hearsay. Does the inclusion of the two residual excep-
tions mean that, in spite of all the other indications,25 the Rules in
fact rejected the traditional approach to hearsay?
II. THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTIONS AND THE TRADITIONAL
HEARSAY APPROACH
Rule 804(b)(5) permits the introduction of an out-of-court asser-
tion even though the hearsay does not fit within a class exception.26
Basically, once the advance notice requirement is satisfied this
residual exception permits the introduction of hearsay upon a show-
ing that the statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness equivalent to the specific exceptions of Rule 804,27 and that the
proffered hearsay is more probative than other reasonably obtaina-
ble evidence. These two requirements look like restatements of the
reliability and necessity concepts which seemingly give the judge
power to assess the admissibility of hearsay in a sharply different
fled the rules. Id at 345 & 377 (both exceptions stated, "[bly way of illustration only, and not
by way of limitation, the following are examples of statements conforming with the require-
ments of this rule .... ). Proposed rule 8-03 listed 23 such illustrations, id. at 345-50, and
proposed rule 8-04 listed five at 377-78.
This approach was quickly abandoned. The Supreme Court rejected the subordination of
the specific hearsay exceptions to the principles of reliability and necessity as too drastic a
change from the traditional hearsay doctrine. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2,
at 499. In the revised draft, the "illustrations" became categorical exceptions. FED. R. EVID.
(Revised Draft), 51 F.R.D. 315, 419-22, 438-39 (1971). The hearsay structure reverted to the
traditional framework.
25. See supra note 24.
26. (B) HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(5) OTHER EXCEPTIONS. A statement not specifically covered by any of the forego-
ing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(13) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C)
the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admit-
ted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse
party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). FED. R. EVID. 803(24) tracks Rule 804(b)(5) except that it does
not require that the declarant be unavailable.
27. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(l)-(4) recognizes hearsay exceptions for former testimony,
dying declarations, statements against interest, and statements of personal or family history.
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and expanded fashion than permitted by the traditional approach.
Instead of determining whether the circumstances surrounding the
assertion satisfy the elements of an exception, the judge determines
whether the hearsay is necessary and trustworthy.
Viewed this way, the hearsay catchalls appear to abandon the
common law approach. Legislative history, however, shows that
the drafters of the residual exceptions did not intend to upset the
traditional framework.
The 1971 draft of the Rules, which adopted the traditional hear-
say framework, contained the forerunners of the residual excep-
tions.28 The Advisory Committee's introductory note to these
provisions stated that, although the specific exceptions draw fully
from past knowledge concerning hearsay, it would be "presumptu-
ous" to believe that all worthwhile hearsay had been listed.29 So
that the hearsay rule would not be "a closed system," two residual
exceptions were included.3" The Committee then warned that the
catchalls "do not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial dis-
cretion, but they do provide for treating new and presently unantici-
pated situations which demonstrate trustworthiness within the spirit
of specifically stated exceptions."3
The residual exceptions met resistance. The House of Repre-
sentatives eliminated them, explaining, "The [House Judiciary]
Committee deleted these provisions. . . as injecting too much un-
certainty into the law of evidence and impairing the ability of prac-
titioners to prepare for trial."
32
The Senate reinstated them. The Senate Judiciary Committee
concluded that catchalls were necessary, but, concerned about un-
dercutting existing hearsay doctrine, agreed "with those supporters
of the House version who felt that an overly broad residual hearsay
exception could emasculate the hearsay rule and the recognized ex-
ceptions . . . ., The Senate Report concluded that the residual
28. FED. R. EVID. (Revised Draft), 51 F.R.D. 315, 422, 439 (1971). At the conclusion
of each list of specific hearsay exceptions, the draft added, "Other exceptions. A statement
not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
29. Id. at 437, 445.
30. Id
31. Ia (emphasis added). See also FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee intro-
ductory note.
32. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7079. See also 4 J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLIS, THE FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS (1980).
33. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7066. See also J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLES, supra note 32. The Senate
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exceptions were not a grant of broad power to the trial courts, but
were rules with a strictly limited reach:
It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be used
very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The commit-
tee does not intend to establish a broad license for trial judges to
admit hearsay statements that do not fall within one of the other
exceptions contained in rules 803 and 804(b). The residual ex-
ceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of
the hearsay rule, including its present exceptions.34
When the Conference Committee's version, which adopted the
Senate's provision with the addition of the notice requirement, was
reported on the floor of the House, questions were raised about the
residual provisions' effect on the traditional hearsay approach.
Representative Holtzman was concerned that the catchall excep-
tions effectively abolished existing hearsay doctrine.35 Representa-
tive Dennis, a Conference Committee member, replied that he
preferred to omit the residual exceptions, but supported them "as a
reasonable compromise which really does not add a whole lot be-
cause. . . the operative language is the court's language; it has got
to be something comparable to the ordinary hearsay exceptions."36
amended the draft by changing "comparable" to "equivalent" guarantees of trustworthiness
and added three additional requirements. Its version read:
OTHER ExCEPTIONS.-A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. If
the court determines that (i) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(ii) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(iii) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served
by admission of the statement into evidence.
CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7098, 7106.
34. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7066.
35. Representative Holtzman stated:
One of these rules-[R]ule 804(b)(5)-as it came out of the conference committee,
creates a general open-ended exception to the hearsay rule. It basically abolishes
the rules against hearsay and leaves it to the discretion of every judge to let in any
kind of hearsay that he wants .... [This conference report will permit the prose-
cution to use any kind of hearsay, as long as some particular [fgederal judge thinks
that the hearsay statement is trustworthy. . . .The conference committee created
an exception which swallows up the rule ....
120 CONG. REC. 40,892-93 (1974).
36. Id. at 40,894 (emphasis added). Professor Imwinkelried, advocating an expansive
interpretation of the residual exceptions, cited Representative Holtzman's comments and
concluded, "Notwithstanding Representative Holtzman's vigorous opposition, the House and
Senate adopted the compromise language hammered out in the Conference Committee." Im-
winkelried, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 239, 252 (1978). Imwinkelried, however, fails to mention anything
about the reply of Representative Dennis.
In assessing the intended reach of the residual provision, the Third Circuit noted Repre-
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This legislative history illustrates the intended scope of the
residual exceptions. They were adopted to allow for growth and
flexibility in the hearsay rule, but only within the spirit of the tradi-
tional approach. Congress never intended that a trial judge admit
hearsay under a residual exception whenever he believed it neces-
sary and reliable or true. Only hearsay comparable to the hearsay
permitted under a specific exception was to be admitted.
Although the legislative intent is clear, the language of the
residual exceptions is not. Rule 804(b)(5) contains six require-
ments. 37  Of these, the courts have been most concerned with the
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" ele-
ment.38 This wording is not precise enough to give much guidance
sentative Dennis' response and stated, "Representative Dennis, because of his role in Con-
gressional consideration of the rules, would seem to be an 'authoritative person' whose
statements are entitled to some weight in evaluating the legislative intent in modifying the
residual rules of hearsay." United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 347 n.9 (3d Cir. 1978). A
Rule 804(b)(5) interpretation required the court to "keep in mind its limited scope as in-
tended by Congress." Id. at 347. See also United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022, 1026 (8th
Cir. 1979) ("The history of Rule 804(b)(5) and its counterpart, Rule 803(24), indicates that
Congress did not intend to create a broad new hearsay exception. The intent of Congress was
that Rule 804(b)(5) would be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances.").
Accord United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Lowery v. Maryland, 401
F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1975).
37. The requirements of Rule 804(b)(5) are: (1) that the declarant is unavailable; (2) the
hearsay is not "specifically covered" by any of the specific exceptions of Rule 804 but still has
"equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" to them; (3) that the hearsay goes
to prove a material fact; (4) that the hearsay is "more probative" than any other evidence
reasonably obtainable by the hearsay's proponent; (5) that the general purposes of the rules
and the interests of justice will be served by introducing the hearsay; and (6) that the hear-
say's proponent give advance notice of his intention to use the hearsay. See FED. R. EviD.
804(b)(5).
38. "The courts have been most concerned with the requirement that there be circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those that justify other hearsay excep-
tions." R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 503. See also United States v.
Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 960 (6th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983) ("Although there
is general agreement that grand jury testimony can be admitted under Rule 804(b)(5), differ-
ences exist as to the exact terms of its admission, particularly on the question of what consti-
tutes 'equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness' within the meaning of the
rule.").
The least significant elements are those requiring that the hearsay prove a material fact
and that the hearsay admission serve the general purposes of the rules and the interests of
justice. The legislative history of the hearsay exceptions fals to explain the meaning of either
element; commentators agree that neither has any real substance. See, eg., Yasser, Strangu-
lating Hearsay: The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, I1 TEx. TECH L. REv. 587,
608 (1980) ("The requirement that evidence be of a material fact is redundant and unneces-
sary, because if not material, the evidence would not be relevant and would be inadmissible
under Rule[s] 401 and 402."); accord Sonenshein, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal
Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867, 874 n.46 (1982).
One court interpreted the material fact language to mean "the exception should not be used
for trivial or collateral matters." United States v. Iaconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 559
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whether to admit the hearsay under a residual exception. Instead, it
has been viewed as a grant of broad discretionary power to trial
judges.39 Thus far, the higher courts have furnished little guidance
regarding the exercise of this discretion.
III. THE HEARSAY ARTICLE AND GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
Grand jury testimony provides a useful arena in which to ex-
amine the proper operation of a residual exception. The drafters
specified, in several hearsay provisions, that grand jury testimony is
normally not to be admitted at trial." Consistent with these provi-
sions, the drafters did not intend for the residual exceptions to sanc-
tion wholesale admission of grand jury testimony.
A. Grand Jury Testimony as Former Testimony
A party seeking to introduce grand jury testimony at trial is try-
ing to admit former testimony which the hearsay exception for for-
mer testimony, Rule 804(b)(1), does not allow.41 The exception's
key requirement is that the party against whom the former testi-
mony is being offered "had an opportunity and similar motive to
develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."
4 2
(E.D.N.Y.), affid, 540 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977). Even read
this way, the requirement matters little. See R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at
503 ("This reading, like the more technical reading, will not limit the applicability of the
exceptions where they truly matter.").
The general purposes and interests of justice clause is redundant; it is merely a restate-
ment of Rule 102. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 803(24)[01],
at 803-379 (1985); see also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 503 ("[I]f the
statement is material, trustworthy and necessary, the purposes of the rules and the interests of
justice will almost certainly be served by its admission.").
39. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 38, at % 803(24)[01], at 803-374 ("Since
there is an enormous variation in the guarantee of trustworthiness among these specific ex-
ceptions, the range of discretion granted the trial judge [by a residual exception] is quite
large.").
40. See infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
41. RULE 804. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE...
(B) HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(1) FORMER TESTIMONY. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law
in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the
testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in inter-
est, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross,
or redirect examination.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
42. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). The Rule's history demonstrates the importance of
this requirement. The draft which the Supreme Court submitted to Congress required an
opportunity to develop the testimony, but that opportunity did not necessarily have to be
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Since grand jury testimony is produced in an ex parte proceeding,
no one besides the prosecutor has the chance to develop the testi-
mony. Thus, grand jury testimony is usually not admissible as for-
mer testimony.43
B. Grand Jury Testimony as Statements Against Interest
The grand jury testimony sought to be introduced at trial often
takes the form of statements against interest. The declarant tells the
grand jurors, "I committed the crime and the defendant did it with
me." Even though Rule 804(b)(3) 4 contains a specific exception
for statements against interest, this sort of grand jury testimony is
not to be routinely admitted under this exception.
A statement to grand jurors may not be reliable as against inter-
est just because a declarant implicates himself along with others. In
these circumstances, the declarant may have strong motives to fal-
sify. The Rules Advisory Committee cautioned against admitting
such hearsay under Rule 804(b)(3) because the statements may not
truly be against interest, but rather, an attempt to gain favor with
afforded the party opposing the hearsay at trial as long as the motive and interest to develop
the testimony were "similar to those of the party against whom now offered." FED. R. EVID.
(Revised Draft), 51 F.R.D. 315, 438 (1971).
Congress found this too lax. The House Report stated, "The Committee considered that
it is generally unfair to impose upon the party against whom the hearsay is being offered
responsibility for the manner in which the witness was previously handled by another party."
H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7075, 7088. Consequently, Congress inserted the more restrictive provision into
the Rule.
43. Grand jury testimony may be admissible as former testimony against the govern-
ment. See United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.N.J. 1978) (grand jury testimony
admissible when offered by criminal defendants under Rule 804(b)(1) because the prosecution
had the opportunity to develop the testimony in the grand jury); see also United States v.
Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980) (suggesting,
without holding, admissibility of grand jury testimony as former testimony if introduced
against the government).
44. RULE 804. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE
(B) HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(3) STATEMENT AGAINST INTEREST. A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by
him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declar-
ant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
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the authorities.4' Grand jury testimony is not routinely admissible
as a statement against interest.46
C. Grand Jury Testimony as Admissions by a Coconspirator
The grand jury testimony sought to be introduced often takes
the form of the witness claiming that he and the defendant were
coconspirators. While Rule 801(d)(2)(E) exempts the admission of
a coconspirator from the hearsay ban, it does not permit the intro-
duction of this type of grand jury testimony. To be admissible, the
Rule requires the statements be made by a "co-conspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."'47
Conspiracy testimony before the grand jury does not further the
illegal enterprise. Furthermore, since the testimony usually comes
after the witness has been arrested or his part in the conspiracy has
otherwise ended, the statements are not made during the course of
the conspiracy.4" For these reasons, the testimony is not admissible
as a coconspirator's statement.
45. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note. See also Comment, Inculpatory
Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 164
(1983) ("Other motives to falsify may be present even when there is no fear of reprisal for
admitting a crime: the desire to share blame with another; the wish for revenge; the hope of
diverting attention from oneself, and even publicity seeking or simple lying."); United States
v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1102 (5th Cit. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982)
(adding another motive to falsify accusatory statements against interest: "the enmity often
generated in a conspiracy gone awry .... ").
46. Courts have been wary of admitting statements made to law enforcement agents as
statements against interest when the declarant inculpates others besides himself. See
Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d at 1102-03 (statements made while in custody cannot be admitted
as statements against interest). Most courts have not drawn such an absolute rule. See E.
CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 279, at 826 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. However, courts "know that statements to law enforcement offi-
cials may be part of a plea bargaining process or may be otherwise motivated by a desire to
curry favor. This does not mean that such statements are never admitted. It does mean that
such statements are subject to close scrutiny." R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2,
at 491.
47. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). A statement is not hearsay if it "is offered against a
party and is... a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in further-
ance of the conspiracy." Id.
48. Once a conspiracy has ended, the statements of its former members are admissi-
ble only against themselves.. . .Conspiracies are considered to have ended when
the conspiracy has achieved its goal or has in some other way been broken up or
disbanded. Thus, the arrest or indictment of the conspirators will be treated as
terminating the conspiracy.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 398.
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D. Grand Jury Testimony as Inconsistent Statements
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 49 permits the introduction of inconsistent
statements as proof of the statements' contents. Prior to its enact-
ment, the Rule produced a struggle in Congress about whether
grand jury testimony ought to come within its boundaries."
Although the current Rule permits such testimony, the restrictions
on its admissibility illustrate the congressional expectation that
grand jury testimony would not be routinely admissible under the
hearsay article.
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) does not require that the inconsistent state-
ment have been taken subject to cross-examination. An inconsis-
tent statement may be admitted for its truth if the declarant testifies
49. RULE 801. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply under this article:
(D) STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT HEARSAY. A statement is not hearsay if -
(1) PRIOR STATEMENT BY WITNESS. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty
of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition ....
FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
50. Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as sent to Congress was much broader than that finally adopted.
The original version allowed the introduction of all statements for their truth as long as the
declarant was subject to cross-examination. FED. R. EVID. (Revised Draft), 51 F.R.D. 315,
413 (1971).
The House narrowed this provision and provided that a prior inconsistent statement was
admissible only if it had been made "under oath [and] subject to cross-examination ....
120 CONG. REc. 2366, 2383 (1974). The Senate, strenuously urged by the Justice Depart-
ment that the bill be changed back to the Supreme Court version, rejected the House version
and reinstated the earlier provision. See Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on HR. 5463
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (1973) (testimony of
Vincent Rakestraw, Assistant Attorney General).
The major reason for the Justice Department's position was a concern about organized
crime's intimidation of witnesses:
The argument in favor of admitting prior inconsistent statements as evidence stems
largely from the fact that, in organized crime cases, prospective witnesses who have
given grand jury or other statements to law enforcement authorities are often intim-
idated and caused to change their story at trial. In such cases, the prior statement
can, to be sure, be used to impeach their testimony, but if the witness is the only or
the principal witness against the accused, the criminal tactic succeeds since the gov-
ernment's case must fail for lack of proof.
Id. at 358 (Senate Judiciary Comm. Staff Memorandum). The House Report noted that the
draft version had some support "based largely on the need to counteract the effect of witness
intimidation in criminal cases ...." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7086.
The Senate Report specifically noted that "[t]he House severely limited the admissibility
of prior inconsistent statements by adding a requirement that the prior statement must have
been subject to cross-examination, thus precluding even the use of grand jury statements." S.
REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
7051, 7062.
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at trial, is subject to cross-examination, and the prior statement was
given under oath "at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a
deposition ... ."I' The express purpose of the "other proceed-
ings" language was to permit the use of grand jury testimony con-
taining inconsistent statements. 2
The Rule, however, restricts the introduction of grand jury testi-
mony. The availability of trial cross-examination is crucial; prior
inconsistent statements, including grand jury testimony, may only
be admitted when the declarant can be cross-examined in front of
the trial jury.53 If the declarant is absent, the Rule cannot be used.
This review of various provisions of the hearsay articles illus-
trates that the specific rules admitting hearsay exclude the whole-
sale introduction of grand jury testimony. Interpreting the catchall
exceptions to allow systematic admission of grand jury testimony is
inconsistent with the drafters' intentions.
IV. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT AND GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
The Fourth Circuit has been a leader in admitting grand jury
testimony under the residual exceptions.54 The key element in its
analytic framework for the residual exceptions-whether sufficient
51. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
52. The Conference Committee stated that Rule 801(d)(1)(A) "as adopted covers state-
ments before a grand jury." CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7104. See also J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLES, supra note
32. Professor Blakey has stated:
The difference between the House version, requiring that the statement have been
made "subject to cross-examination" and the version finally adopted, providing that
the statement must have been made "under oath subject to the penalty of perjury"
during some sort of proceeding, is that statements made during testimony before a
grand jury, where only the prosecution may present evidence, can now be used to
support a verdict at a subsequent trial despite a change of heart and story by the
declarant.
Blakey, Substantive Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
64 KY. L.J. 3, 9 (1975). See also R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 515-16
('he language admitting inconsistent statements made under oath at 'other proceedings'
was included at the insistence of the Senate so that grand jury testimony would be admissible
where it varied from the declarant's courtroom statements.").
53. See Blakey, supra note 52, at 10 (noting that "the existence of an opportunity for
present cross-examination of the witness at trial provides adequate protection for the party or
parties against whom the evidence is offered."); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) advisory com-
mittee note (stating that the dangers of hearsay are largely nonexistent for inconsistent state-
ments because the declarant testifies subject to cross-examination in front of the jury).
54. See McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936, 939 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("The Courts of Appeals are struggling with the problem of the
admissibility of hearsay evidence not falling within one of the traditional exceptions to inad-
missibility. The Fourth Circuit has taken a relatively liberal view of the admissibility of
grand jury testimony .... ").
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corroboration exists at trial to establish that the hearsay is trustwor-
thy-has been used by almost all courts interpreting the catchalls."5
The approach to the residual provisions which places reliance upon
corroboration is incorrect. It leads not only to the near routine ad-
mission of grand jury testimony, in violation of the drafters' intent,
but also subverts the hearsay framework, of the Rules.
A. The Fourth Circuit Cases
1. United States v. West
United States v. West56 was the initial Fourth Circuit case to
consider the admissibility of grand jury testimony under a residual
exception. The prosecution's crucial evidence that three defendants
committed federal heroin offenses was Michael Victor Brown's
grand jury testimony.
Brown "volunteered" his services to federal agents while jailed
on a pending charge. The agents arranged for West to purchase
drugs from two of the defendants.57 After each drug transaction,
which was observed, recorded and photographed, a drug enforce-
ment agent wrote a detailed statement of the events.58 Brown then
read, corrected, and signed the statement.59
When Brown subsequently appeared before the grand jury, the
"government attorney read the statements that Brown had signed
and [had him confirm] they were correct."60 Before trial, Brown
was murdered. The prosecution sought to introduce the grand jury
testimony under Rule 804(b)(5). 61  The trial court admitted the
55. Lewis, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: Shuffling the Wild
Cards, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 101, 116-23 (1983).
56. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
57. Id. at 1133.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1134. As a result of his cooperation, Brown was released from jail, his drug
charge dismissed, a parole detainer lifted, and he was given $855. Id
61. Id. The notice requirement of Rule 804(b)(5) was clearly met. The prosecution
notified the defendants a week before the scheduled trial date of its intention to rely on the
residual exception. After the grand jury testimony was ruled admissible, a week's continu-
ance was given. Id. Compliance with the notice provision, however, is not always as clear.
The Rule explicitly states that if pretrial notice is not given, the hearsay cannot be admit-
ted. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5). Notice is required "to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it
. .. Id. See also Note, The Federal Courts and the Catchall Hearsay Exceptions, 25
WAYNE L. REv. 1361, 1375 (1979) ("[P]retrial notice must be given in all circumstances. If
notice was not given before trial, the catchall hearsay evidence must not be admitted.").
Some courts have followed this reasoning. See, e-g., United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366,
372 (5th Cir. 1980) ("[Tlhere is absolutely no doubt that Congress intended that the require-
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hearsay, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the resulting
convictions.62
ment of advance notice be rigidly enforced."); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 73 n.30
(2d Cir. 1977).
The majority of courts, however, have "imparted sufficient flexibility to permit the admis-
sion of hearsay under the residual exceptions despite the absence of pretrial notice to the
adverse party when the proponent has not become aware of the need to offer such evidence
until after trial has commenced." Sonenshein, supra note 38, at 901. See, eg., United States
v. Iaconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (although
notice not given in advance of trial, notice during trial held adequate because "some latitude
must be permitted in situations like this in which the need does not become apparent until
after the trial has commenced."). See also United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 348 (3d Cir.
1978) (holding notice during trial sufficient when the trial judge "offered sufficient time, by
means of granting a continuance, for the party against whom the evidence is to be offered to
prepare to meet and contest its admission.").
One commentator argues for flexibility in the notice provision, with the opportunity for a
continuance as the better policy:
Given the uncertain nature of the trial process, there will be occasions when a con-
scientious and farsighted litigator will be faced with situations of genuine surprise,
which could not have reasonably been anticipated. The flexible view satisfies the
purpose of the notice requirements, which is to provide adequate time for the oppo-
nent to prepare, placing the opponent in no worse position than he would have
faced had pretrial notice been given.
Sonenshein, supra note 38, at 904. Other commentators argue in favor of the notice provision
noting that pretrial notice serves functions other than allowing
the adversary an opportunity to question the hearsay. Knowing before trial
whether certain evidence will be admitted may also affect a party's litigation strat-
egy and proclivity to settle. In addition, if notice must be given before trial, hearsay
cannot be resorted to when a party finds that other attempts to prove a point have
not been convincing. It may even be that the requirement of pre-trial notice was
one means by which the Congress meant to ensure that the residual exceptions
would be used "very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances."
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 504.
Even if flexibility is the better approach, it is impermissible. "The language of Rules
803(24) and 804(b)(5) unequivocally require [sic] pretrial notice." Sonenshein, supra note 38,
at 904. See also Yasser, supra note 38, at 608 ("The advance notice requirement is so clearly
stated that to sidestep it is to ffirt with lawlessness.").
Sonenshein has suggested a simple solution to the notice dilemma. "Congress should
amend the residual exception rules to conform to the flexible view of notice and rescue the
courts that have adopted it from decisions which are unquestionably correct as a matter of
policy, but erroneous as a matter of law." Sonenshein, supra note 38, at 905. At least one
state has had the foresight to adopt such flexibility in its version of the residual exception.
See OR. EvID. CODE R. 803(24) (requiring pretrial notice "or [notice] as soon as practicable
after it becomes apparent that such statement is probative of the issues at hand. .... ").
An adverse party's case can be harmed when notice is given during trial, even ifa continu-
ance is available. Courts should not, therefore, blithely accept any excuse for the absence of
advance notice. See United States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 918 (1978) (lack of pretrial notice for introduction of a transcribed interview under Rule
804(b)(5) excused because proponent not aware of witness's poor memory prior to trial; no
reason given why proponent was not aware of poor memory before trial); cf United States v.
laconetti, 540 F.2d 574, 578 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (requiring
pretrial notice be given if at all possible; flexibility accorded only those situations where no-
tice wholly impracticable).
62. West, 574 F.2d at 1131.
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On appeal, the defendants only contested whether the grand
jury testimony satisfied the "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" requirement of Rule 804(b)(5). The court con-
cluded that the trustworthiness guarantees for Brown's testimony
probably exceeded those for some of the specific hearsay excep-
tions.6 3 The hearsay had the requisite assurances of reliability be-
cause of "the corroboration provided by the observations of the
agents, the pictures they took and their recordings of the
conversations."'
2. United States v. Garner
Four days after West, the Fourth Circuit again admitted grand
jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(5). The court's reasoning in
United States v. Garner65 made clear that corroboration is the ana-
lytic key to circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The deci-
sion also exposed the problems, dangers, and shortcomings of
relying on corroboration to justify hearsay admission under the
residual exception.
Warren Robinson's grand jury testimony was introduced
against codefendants who were convicted of heroin offenses. Robin-
son, like the declarant in West, cooperated with authorities to miti-
gate his own criminal liabilities. He told the grand jury that one
codefendant, Garner, had recruited him into a heroin importation
scheme with the defendant, McKethan, who had European sources
for the contraband.66 Robinson also testified that the defendants
took a number of overseas trips and that he accompanied them
twice. 7
Before trial, Robinson decided that he would not testify again.
He persisted in this refusal even though urged to testify by his attor-
ney and threatened with contempt." Although Robinson ulti-
mately testified in court, he repudiated his grand jury testimony,
answered some questions indicating a lack of knowledge, and re-
fused to answer others.69 The trial court admitted the grand jury
testimony under Rule 804(b)(5).
63. Id. at 1135. Judge Widener dissented, disagreeing with the majority's "estimation of
the reliability of testimony taken before a grand jury and therefore not subject to cross-exami-
nation." Id. at 1138.
64. Id. at 1135.
65. 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).
66. Id. at 1143.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, distinguishing
United States v. Gonzalez,7° in which the Fifth Circuit refused to
admit grand jury testimony under the residual exception. In Gonza-
lez, Guerrero was called before the grand jury after his drug impor-
tation conviction. After evasions and proddings, he identified
Gonzalez as the source of the drugs.71 At the subsequent trial,
however, Guerrero refused to testify, and his grand jury testimony
was admitted.72
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding the testimony inadmissible
under Rule 804(b)(5). The court concluded that the grand jury tes-
timony did not have the required guarantees of trustworthiness be-
cause whether Guerrero
told the truth or not was incidental to what would happen to him
if he did not say something. If he answered the questions at the
time, he would be free of the threat of contempt. The important
thing to him was that he gave an answer, be it true or not.7 3
The Fourth Circuit distinguished Gonzalez from Garner because
of the pressure placed on Guerrero to produce answers and because
of his concern that truthful answers could be dangerous.74 This dis-
tinction makes little sense. Similar pressures existed in both Garner
and West, since the declarants faced long prison terms that could be
reduced in exchange for their testimony. The declarants in those
cases were surely aware of the risks involved in testifying against
drug dealers who might become vengeful. The pressures in Garner
and West, then, were precisely those faced by the declarant in Gon-
zalez. The Garner and West declarants had the same possible es-
cape that the Gonzalez declarant had-false testimony.
Garner found the necessary circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness in two forms of corroborating evidence: other trial evi-
dence consistent with the declarant's grand jury testimony and a
defendant's in-court testimony.75
Part of the consistent corroboration came from the trial testi-
mony of McKee, a woman who accompanied Garner and Robinson
on a European drug-importation trip.76 The appellate court ac-
cepted this testimony as a full confirmation of the declarant's grand
70. 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977).
71. Id at 1272.
72. Id
73. Id. at 1273 (emphasis in original).
74. United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144.
75. Id. at 1146.
76. Id. at 1144.
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jury testimony about the overseas trip, failing to acknowledge its
weaknesses compared to the West corroboration.
The testimony in West presented almost no memory problems
since it was based upon records made by police officials nearly con-
temporaneously with the drug transactions.77 They had no appar-
ent motive, other than to obtain a conviction, to testify falsely.
Moreover, the corroboration in West went to almost every aspect of
the grand jury testimony and made the trustworthiness of the hear-
say virtually certain.
McKee's testimony, in contrast, was about events that had oc-
curred more than a year earlier.7" Her motivations for testifying are
not clear, but she was admitting to criminality. If she had made a
deal with the prosecutor, she stood to gain from her confirmation of
Robinson.79 In addition, her testimony only corroborated the de-
clarant about a portion of one trip, a fraction of his grand jury
testimony.
Furthermore, McKee's story corroborated nothing about
Robinson's inculpation of defendant McKethan. McKee had no
contact with McKethan and said nothing about him. Instead, cor-
roboration for Robinson's statements about McKethan was found
in travel documents showing that the two defendants made frequent
European trips.8 0 However, this evidence is very unlike the confir-
matory evidence in West, since the travel records corroborated only
a small portion of the grand jury testimony about McKethan.
This aspect of Garner indicates the Fourth Circuit's willingness
to admit hearsay under Rule 804(b)(5), even though only a fraction
of the hearsay is confirmed by other evidence. The logical extension
of this reasoning must be that, if other evidence corroborates some
77. United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1133 (4th Cir. 1978).
78. See Garner, 574 F.2d at 1145.
79. The Garner court failed to explain what the witness stood to gain by her testimony.
The court did note that the woman shared a hotel room with one defendant while in Europe.
Id. at 1144. If the two were lovers, could this have produced an incentive for the witness to
testify untruthfully to back up the declarant? Cf United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 373
(5th Cir. 1980) (letters exculpating the defendant, written by a friend, held not admissible
under the residual exception where the court found an indicator of unreliability because the
declarant "could well have been motivated by his friendship to fabricate statements in order
to provide Atkins with exculpatory evidence."); United States v. Fredericks, 599 F.2d 262
(8th Cir. 1979) (holding exculpatory statements made to a government investigator unreliable
in part because the declarant was the girlfriend of defendant's brother and thus motivated to
give a more favorable version of the incident).
80. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144. The United States introduced records of airline tickets,
customs declarations, passport endorsements, and European hotel registrations.
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portions of the out-of-court assertions, the uncorroborated parts
must also be reliable.
Whatever the usual merits of such reasoning, it presents difficul-
ties here. Robinson's grand jury testimony stated that a courier had
been used after Garner's first trip to Europe. The documentary evi-
dence not only failed to corroborate this assertion, it showed that it
was false.8" If McKee's testimony and the documents, which only
confirmed some of Robinson's details, were accepted as guarantees
of trustworthiness for the rest of his stay, then proof that part of the
hearsay is wrong ought to establish the unreliability of the remain-
der. The Garner court, however, did not use such logic. Instead, it
concluded, "Testifying from his recollection more than a year later,
Robinson may have been confused about which trip [the courier]
made, but the record of [the courier's] flight provide[s] general cor-
",82roboration of Robinson's testimony ....
Garner's treatment of this evidence about the courier is a selec-
tive approach to corroboration-the court latches on to the evi-
dence that tends to show the truthfulness of the hearsay and ignores
the factors that tend to show its untrustworthiness.8 3 It also shows
a disregard of the basic hearsay dangers. An out-of-court declara-
tion is barred because it may be based upon a bad memory and the
declarant's memory cannot be probed by cross-examination. By ex-
cusing Robinson's inconsistent testimony as a lapse of memory, the
Fourth Circuit ignores one of the fundamental reasons for the rule
excluding hearsay-faulty memory. A demonstration that the de-
clarant had a faulty memory ought to be a reason for excluding his
81. Id. at 1145.
82. Id.
83. The Garner court's treatment of Robinson's trial testimony is also noteworthy. He
testified that his grand jury testimony was untrue. This disavowal of the hearsay has a strong
mark of reliability since it was clearly against Robinson's interest. It was a public confession
of perjury for which he was later indicted. McKethan v. United States, 439 U.S. 936, 939
(1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The recantation may have been
prompted by feared consequences of testifying at trial rather than by honesty. The same
pressures which may have produced a false trial renunciation may also have existed at the
time of the grand jury testimony and produced false testimony there. Moreover, Robinson's
trial testimony that the grand jury testimony was untrue had some corroboration, since it was
established that part of Robinson's statement about the courier was untrue. The Fourth
Circuit failed to consider the possibility that the recantation at trial was every bit as reliable
as the grand jury testimony. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 38,
804(b)(5)[01], at 804-184 ("The end result is the best of all possible worlds for the prosecu-
tion: when a witness is sufficiently available to convey to the jury that he is in mortal fear of
the defendant, but is technically unavailable so that his cross-examination is excused, his
Grand Jury testimony becomes admissible.").
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hearsay; Garner instead uses it to justify the hearsay's admission.
The court stands the hearsay rule on its head.
Garner, however, did not rely solely on evidence consistent with
the grand jury testimony to justify the admission of the hearsay.84
The court also perceived a guarantee of trustworthiness in the de-
fendants' lack of convincing trial testimony."5 Even if it were
proper to consider a defendant's trial testimony in deciding the ad-
missibility of hearsay, that testimony did not change the nature of
the corroboration. Coupling the defendant's testimony with Mc-
Kee's assertions and the travel records still means that Garner
found sufficient corroboration in evidence that failed to establish the
defendant's criminality, came from impeachable sources, confirmed
only a portion of the hearsay, and was partially false. Such a low
standard of corroboration will result in much hearsay being admit-
ted under the residual exceptions.
In addition, permitting the lack of the defendants' credible re-
buttal evidence to corroborate out-of-court testimony raises a host
of questions not considered by the Fourth Circuit. If corroboration
is at least partly found in a defendant's trial testimony or the lack of
testimony, how is a determination on admissibility of hearsay to be
made in advance of trial? What happens if the defendant presents
convincing trial testimony? Should the judge then strike the al-
ready admitted grand jury testimony?
The court's assessment of the defendants' lack of convincing
trial testimony really indicates the ad hoc nature of the corrobora-
tion finding. The court was not guided by any standards that could
be used to decide similar, future admissibility problems.
8 6
Finally, Garner justified the admission of the hearsay by con-
cluding that the trial jury could evaluate it.87 This conclusion came
without any consideration of its radical consequences. Our trials
are presently based on the central premise that a juror can normally
meaningfully evaluate an assertion only after an adversary has a
chance to examine the asserter to expose any possible narration,
sincerity, memory or perception flaws. Does the corroboration in
Garner allow the jury to make valid conclusions about these hearsay
changes? If it does, as the Fourth Circuit implies, our trial system
84. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1145.
85. Id.
86. See also United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978) (intimating that evi-
dence properly admitted because of resultant jury verdict; jury verdict may be an indicator of
trustworthiness).
87. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1144.
[Vol. 36:431
SUBVERSION OF HEARSAY RULE
may change greatly. Assume Robinson did not testify before the
grand jury, but testifies at trial, and proceeds on direct examination
to state everything he told the grand jury in the real case. Upon
cross-examination, however, he refuses to answer any questions.
Can the jury evaluate Robinson's testimony? Is that direct testi-
mony admissible?
The Fourth Circuit should have to conclude, yes, as long as the
same Garner corroboration is present. If Robinson's grand jury tes-
timony can be evaluated and is therefore admissible, so too should
we admit this hypothetical direct testimony. If anything, since the
jurors have observed the demeanor of Robinson during his entire
direct testimony, they can better evaluate the posited testimony
than the grand jury statements. The use of corroboration in Garner
thus leads to the routine admission of direct examination alone, as
long as some confirmatory evidence is produced.8" It leads to con-
victions without cross-examinations. Indeed, this is what happened
to McKethan. Surely, this use of corroboration, which alters the
fundamental structure of our trials by abandoning cross-examina-
tion's central role, is wrong.8 9
3. United States v. Walker
Four years after West and Garner the Fourth Circuit again ap-
plied its interpretation of the residual exceptions to grand jury testi-
mony. In United States v. Walker,90 Parker, a participant in a
marijuana importation scheme, was convicted in an earlier proceed-
88. The Supreme Court has found Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause violations
when defendants, even though they had extensively cross-examined the witnesses, were not
allowed to ask certain questions. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968) (defendant pro-
hibited from asking where the witness lived); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (defend-
ant, who was trying to establish juvenile witness bias, prevented from asking witness about
probationary status); cf United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 822 (1963) (prosecution witness's direct testimony need not be stricken where self-in-
crimination privilege claimed on some cross-examination questions regarding only collateral
matters; direct testimony would have to be stricken where questions concerned matters di-
rectly in issue); United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1975), cerL denied, 423 U.S.
1087 (1976) (defense witness's direct testimony stricken as inadmissible hearsay where self-
incrimination privilege prevented cross-examination on non-collateral matters). Accord
United States v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Brierly, 501 F.2d 1024
(8th Cir.), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 1052 (1974). See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 46, § 19, at 49.
89. Garner has provoked strong criticism. See J. WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
38, % 804(b)(5)[01], at 804-180 (commenting that Rule 804(b)(5) extended to new and unwar-
ranted lengths by the Garner opinion); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 505
("troublesome" case because of the court's admittance of "very damaging evidence made in
circumstances that ought to have cast doubt on its reliability").
90. 696 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
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ing. After his conviction, Parker testified before the grand jury pur-
suant to a grant of immunity and implicated the Walker defendants.
At trial, Parker claimed his right against self-incrimination and
refused to testify, stating that he feared a perjury prosecution.9
Parker was ruled unavailable at trial, and the portion of his grand
jury testimony that tracked the in-court testimony of another wit-
ness was admitted under Rule 804(b)(5). 91 The Fourth Circuit af-
firmed, admitting the entire grand jury testimony, since sufficient
corroboration existed for it taken as a whole.9 3
The Walker decision, however, reveals more than another appli-
cation of the residual hearsay exception finding adequate circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness from corroborative evidence.
The Fourth Circuit's approach slighted factors indicating the possi-
ble untrustworthiness of the grand jury testimony, ignored the hear-
say dangers, and failed to use neutral principles.
The Walker declarant wrote to the prosecutor before trial stat-
ing that he had been "scared to death" when testifying, told the
grand jury things that he could not remember and would have said
anything to stay out of prison.9" This recantation was given the
same short shrift as a similar disavowal in Garner, although it raises
serious doubts about the trustworthiness of the grand jury testi-
mony. The Walker court dispensed with the declarant's disavowal
by merely stating, "[t]hough he had been granted immunity for his
testimony, however, no one had promised him lighter punishment
91. Id. at 279.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 280-8 1. The Fourth Circuit did express its concern that the trial court's ruling
may not have satisfied the "more probative" requirement of Rule 804(b)(5). Id. See United
States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the "more probative" require-
ment of Rule 804(b)(5) not satisfied), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 776 (1985).
Unlike the language that the hearsay be offered to prove a material fact and that its ad-
mission must serve the interests of justice, see supra note 37, the "more probative" require-
ment would seem to be "substantively important." R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra
note 2, at 503. Some courts refuse to read this language strictly. See, eg., United States v.
Muscato, 534 F. Supp. 969, 979 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (refusing to interpret "more probative"
requirement narrowly to exclude cumulative evidence). See also, Lewis, supra note 55, at 113
(noting that the "more probative" requirement is often ignored); Sonenshein, supra note 38,
at 893 (residual exceptions should be applied only to those few situations "where the prof-
fered hearsay is either the only evidence available on the point, or the evidence is least attenu-
ated from the issue on which it is offered.").
If the hearsay is admitted, its opponent may not be able to gain a reversal because the
more probative requirement was violated. United States v. Mastrangelo, 561 F. Supp. 1114
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd on other grounds, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2385
(1984).
94. Walker, 696 F.2d at 280-81.
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for it."95 That response begs the question. Just because the declar-
ant was not formally promised leniency does not mean that he
lacked an incentive to lie. A person in this predicament might well
believe, even without an express promise, that giving testimony
pleasing to the government might ultimately reduce his punish-
ment. If so, the declarant still had reason to give inculpatory testi-
mony to the grand jury whether or not it was the truth. This the
Fourth Circuit ignored.
Walker also demonstrates a lack of neutral principles. It stated
that even though only a portion of the grand jury testimony was
admitted, the appellate court could examine the entire grand jury
testimony.96 On this point, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, "If the
excluded portion of Parker's grand jury testimony contained estab-
lished falsehoods, we would unhesitatingly conclude that they cast
doubt upon the whole; when it contains substantiated truths, a re-
flection of reliability is cast upon the whole." 97
This bald assertion of the effect of proven falsehoods came with-
out reference to Garner, where the grand jury testimony contained
testimony proved false.98 There the Fourth Circuit did not con-
clude that the falsehood cast doubt upon all of the grand jury testi-
mony. There was no reason given why the blanket statement of
Walker did not apply to Garner. Perhaps, this statement really il-
lustrates the fundamental consistency of the Fourth Circuit-point
out everything that tends to justify the admission of the grand jury
95. Id.
96. Walker gave short shrift to the hearsay dangers when it, like Garner, concluded that
the jurors could evaluate the hearsay. I at 281. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying
text. The court noted that because the grand jury testimony had been presented to the trial
jury in "question and answer form, the jury could assess for itself the extent to which the
questions were suggestive." Walker, 696 F.2d at 281. But see United States v. Gonzalez, 559
F.2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977) (leading questions are a sign of unreliability). Of course, our
evidentiary law contains a general ban on leading questions. See FED. R. EVID. 611(c). The
prohibition's existence indicates that suggestive questions present more dangers than Walker
recognizes. One obvious concern is that leading questions may result in answers with little, if
any, relevance. See United States v. Muscato, 534 F. Supp. 969, 977 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). The
Walker court's lack of concern about leading questions may indicate an assumption underly-
ing the opinion about why the declarant did not testify at trial. With logic that applies here,
Professor Blakey has commented about the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements:
This is a desirable result if one believes that most witnesses who contradict out-of-
court statements do so for fear or favor. But it is not a desirable result if one be-
lieves that out-of-court statements may have been obtained by leading or misleading
the witness. Of course, the jury will do its best to decide whether the out-of-court
version is true, but the general ban on hearsay is based upon a belief that this is not
protection enough.
Blakey, supra note 52, at 43.
97. Walker, 696 F.2d at 281.
98. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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testimony under Rule 804(b)(5) and ignore anything that cuts
against admissibility.
4. United States v. Murphy
United States v. Murphy9 9 involved the grand jury testimony of
Lattisaw, the defendant's confederate. In return for his full testi-
mony before the grand and trial juries, the government promised
Lattisaw he would not be prosecuted for two other offenses. At
Murphy's trial, Lattisaw refused to be sworn, and his grand jury
testimony was admitted under Rule 804(b)(5). The Fourth Circuit
affirmed, holding that there were "abundant indicia of reliability
and trustworthiness of Lattisaw's grand jury testimony."" ° Once
again, these indicia were found in corroboration. The principal cor-
roborative evidence came from a witness who had driven the get-
away car. The court reasoned that "[h]er testimony was entirely
consistent with Lattisaw's grand jury testimony."1 °1 Additional
corroboration was found in the testimony of two eyewitnesses and
in the recovery of the getaway car containing a mask used in the
robbery.
5. United States v. Thomas
The trend in these Fourth Circuit cases is to admit the corrobo-
rated grand jury testimony of an unavailable witness. Since grand
jury testimony of a sole witness seldom stands alone in implicating a
defendant, some corroboration for the hearsay almost always exists.
Grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(5) is then routinely admit-
ted. This trend became even clearer in United States v. Thomas.10 2
Two declarants testified before the grand jury in Thomas. One
declarant had participated in the marijuana importation scheme
and, granted immunity, told the grand jury that the trawler he was
aboard had picked up contraband in South America. The other de-
clarant, a commercial fisherman, told the grand jury he had seen
the vessel off the South American coast weeks before its seizure, and
that it did not appear to have been engaged in fishing.
When neither declarant could be produced at trial, the court
permitted their grand jury testimony to be introduced under Rule
804(b)(5). The Fourth Circuit affirmed, stating that it "is clear
99. 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cit. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
100. Id. at 286.
101. Id.
102. 705 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 890 (1983).
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from West and Garner the grand jury testimony of an unavailable
witness may be introduced under certain conditions . .. " The
decision did not discuss the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness requirement. 4 Although the appellate opinion
103. Id. at 711-12.
104. The court only discussed the unavailability requirement of Rule 804(b)(5). Id. at
712.
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant -
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement de-
spite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable
to procure his attendance. . . by process or other reasonable means.
FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
Unavailability has been a central issue in a number of cases. In some, the concern is
whether the requirements of Rule 804(a)(5) are satisfied. See, ag., United States v. Smith,
577 F. Supp. 1232, 1233-35 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (witness refused to respond to subpoena; held,
reasonable efforts had been made and witness was therefore unavailable).
More often, the unavailability issue has concerned a witness who appears in court but
refuses to testify. See, eg., United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982), cert de-
nied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983) (grand jury testimony admitted where exercise of spousal privilege
made declarant unavailable). Cf United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977)
(spousal privilege not permitted where marriage a sham; declarant available to testify).
A more difficult unavailability issue concerns the witness who is present and has no valid
privilege but refuses to testify. See FED. R. EVID. Rule 804(a)(2). The declarant is unavaila-
ble if he refuses to testify, even though cited for contempt. See, eg., United States v. Carlson,
547 F.2d 1346, 1353 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (declarant would not
testify although sentenced to six months for contempt). Courts, however, have found un-
availability even in the absence of a contempt citation. See, ag., United States v. Murphy,
696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983) (declarant unavailable even
though he was in court, refused to testify, and was not held in contempt); United States v.
Boulhanis, 677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982) (declarant found un-
available even though not cited for, or threatened with, contempt; grand jury testimony ad-
mitted); cf. United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980) (declarant not
unavailable where he was not held in contempt although refusal to testify broke a plea bar-
gain, thereby subjecting him to further prosecution).
Of the two residual exceptions, only Rule 804(b)(5) expressly requires the unavailability
of the declarant. The "more probative" requirement, however, also makes the availability of
the declarant an important consideration under Rule 803(24). See United States v. Mathis,
559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1977) (hearsay inadmissible under Rule 803(24) where declarant avail-
able); cf. United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 628 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
840 (1980) ("Under no circumstances, including coercive acts by a defendant, should cross-
examination of an available witness not be constitutionally mandated.") (emphasis in origi-
nal). But see J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 38, 804(b)(5)[01], at 804-173 (where
declarant available and does not appear, hearsay evidence should only be admitted under
Rule 803(24) "in circumstances where the guarantees of trustworthiness are inordinately
high, or the evidence is of a kind where cross-examination would not enhance reliability").
Consequently, a court's determination of a declarant's availability is always important for
deciding a residual hearsay question. See Lewis, supra note 55, at 126 (advocating elimina-
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identified some corroboration, it was uniquely different from the
preceding cases.
The defendants' conviction was largely dependent upon the
grand jury testimony."' 5 The only non-hearsay corroboration was
the seizure of the trawler, the evidence that the seized trawler did
not appear to have been engaged in fishing, and the discovery of
small amounts of marijuana on board. That evidence did little to
establish the defendants' guilt as large-scale importers. Thus, two
sets of otherwise inadmissible out-of-court assertions corroborated
each other and justified the admission of each. The Thomas court
accepted such corroboration as sufficient under Rule 804(b)(5)
without further discussion. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's position
must be that grand jury testimony of unavailable witnesses is rou-
tinely admissible under the residual exception whenever the hearsay
has a modicom of corroboration.
V. ERRORS IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
The Fourth Circuit's approach to Rule 804(b)(5), which looks
to corroboration at the time of trial to determine whether the hear-
say will be admitted, is wrong for five reasons.10 6 First, it has led to
tion of Rule 803(24) to insure that residual hearsay is truly necessary). Cf. D. BINDER,
HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 40.05, at 446 (2d ed. 1983) (asserting that Rule 804(b)(5) is mean-
ingless because, although Rule 804(b)(5) is identical to Rule 803(24), Rule 804(b)(5) applies
only if declarant is unavailable; Rule 803(24) applies regardless of declarant's availability).
105. Thomas, 705 F.2d at 711.
106. Although all of the Fourth Circuit cases expressly rely upon corroboration to justify
the admission of the grand jury testimony, another rationale is implicit in many of the deci-
sions. The court frequently implies that the defendants caused the declarant's unavailability;
this may have affected the court's decisions. See, eg., United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131,
1134 (4th Cir. 1978) (declarant and four potential witnesses murdered after agreeing to coop-
erate in narcotics investigations, but government failed to offer any evidence to show that
defendants were responsible for the murders); United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1143
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978) (noting that general impression from trial court
transcript was that pressures brought upon defendant made him unwilling to testify); United
States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983) (noting
strong indications that declarant was being programmed by defendants not to testify at trial).
This appears to have occurred in other circuits as well. See, eg., United States v. Boulhanis,
677 F.2d 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982) (suggesting that declarant's refusal
to testify was based on fear of reprisal by defendant); cf. Herdman v. Smith, 707 F.2d 839
(5th Cir. 1983) (without discussing waiver theory, the court held in a civil suit that an affida-
vit, given to police 18 months after defendant instructed the declarant, who was the wife of
defendant's employee, admissible under a residual exception). These cases may also be con-
strued to indicate that the court was admitting the grand jury testimony because the defend-
ants' actions had waived or forfeited any objection to the hearsay's admission.
Courts have held that if a defendant waives his sixth amendment right to confront a grand
jury witness at trial, he concomitantly waives his objection under Rule 804(b)(5) to the intro-
duction of the hearsay. A defendant's behavior that makes the grand jury witness unavailable
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the near routine admission of grand jury testimony. This interpre-
tation of the residual exception fundamentally conflicts with other
hearsay provisions."
Second, Congress intended that the residual exceptions would
authorize the admission of hearsay only in truly exceptional circum-
stances.108 The Fourth Circuit cases demonstrate that corroborated
grand jury testimony is just not that rare. 109
Third, the corroboration approach creates an unnecessary con-
at trial can effectuate such a waiver. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630-33 (5th Cir.),
cerl denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 628 (10th Cir.), cerL
denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); cf. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1978) (holding grand jury testimony admissible under Rule 804(b)(5)
where defendant waived his confrontation rights).
Courts, however, are split on the appropriate burden of proof to establish such a waiver.
Compare Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630-31 (adopting a clear and convincing evidence standard) with
United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2385
(1984) and Balano, 618 F.2d at 629 (both adopting a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard). Mastrangelo illustrates the importance of this dispute since on remand the court found
that a waiver had been established by a preponderance of the evidence, but not by clear and
convincing evidence. United States v. Mastrangelo, 561 F. Supp. 1114, 1119-20 (E.D.N.Y.),
afl'd, 722 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1983).
A split in the circuits may also be developing regarding what behavior constitutes a
waiver. Compare Thevis, 665 F.2d at 630 (holding that a defendant waives his confrontation
rights when, for the purpose of preventing a witness from testifying, he causes the witness to
be unavailable) and Mastrangelo, 722 F.2d at 14 (holding that a defendant's failure to inform
the authorities that a witness was going to be killed constituted a waiver) with Olson v.
Green, 668 F.2d 421 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 456 U.S. 1009 (1982) (holding that only the
defendant's personal actions or actions of someone directed by defendant can waive the de-
fendant's confrontation rights; coconspirator's intimidation of a witness did not constitute a
waiver).
Although the Fourth Circuit implied that witness intimidation was present, the court
specifically rejected a waiver of confrontation rights as a basis for its decision in the grand
jury cases. See, eg., Murphy, 696 F.2d at 286 (no waiver of confrontation rights even where
strong indications found that defendants were manipulating grand jury witnesses).
The government's apparent fault may also influence the court. See United States v. To-
ney, 599 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1979) (criticizing government's handling of declarant's statement,
stating that defendant should have been allowed to introduce it under Rule 804(b)(5); court's
discussion did not mention the guarantees of trustworthiness requirement).
107. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 50.
109. United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 629 (5th Cir. 1982):
Corroborated grand jury testimony which for one reason or another is unavailable
at trial is neither rare nor exceptional, and in our opinion its general admission
under this theory would constitute a "major revision" of the hearsay rule that, as
the Senate Judiciary Committee admonished, is for the legislature, not the judiciary.
See also Burstein, Admission of an Unavailable Witness' Grand Jury Testimony: Can It Be
Justified?, 4 CARDozo L. REV. 263, 268 (1983) ("[Ihe need to admit prior grand jury testi-
mony is somewhat commonplace. . . ."); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 38,
804(b)(5)[01], at 804-179 ("Rule 804(b)(5) should not become an automatic formula for in-
troducing uncross-examined grand jury statements or other statements of dubious reliability
which do not meet the requirements of other hearsay exceptions.").
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flict within the residual exception itself. Rule 804(b)(5) not only
requires equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,
but also requires that the proffered hearsay be necessary, that is,
more probative than other reasonably obtainable evidence. The
more the hearsay is corroborated, however, the less necessary it be-
comes. Relying upon corroboration to establish trustworthiness
leads to the anomalous result that the more trustworthiness is
demonstrated, the less likely it is that the hearsay should be admit-
ted.110 Surely, Congress did not intend an interpretation that inevi-
tably results in internal conflict.
Fourth, since the term "corroborating circumstances" was used
in Rule 804(b)(3), Congress would have used it again in Rule
804(b)(5) if corroboration had been intended to guarantee trustwor-
thiness. 11 Rule 804(b)(3) classifies as a hearsay exception state-
ments that tend to subject an unavailable declarant to criminal
liability. That rule, however, imposes a special burden on the crimi-
nal defendant attempting to exculpate himself by introducing such
hearsay. The accused must not only show that the statement is
against penal interest, but also that "corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."1 " 2
Fifth, the Fourth Circuit failed to consider the "near-miss"
problem-the residual exception treatment of hearsay that nar-
110. While the Fourth Circuit ignores this tension, other courts that have relied upon
corroboration to justify the admission of grand jury testimony have recognized it. See, eg.,
United States v. Boulhanis, 677 F.2d 586, 588 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982)
(noting that corroboration undermines the second condition of hearsay admissibility under
Rule 804(b)(5), which requires that the declaration be the most probative evidence possible);
United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that exclusive reliance on
corroboration to establish trustworthiness "might increase the likelihood of admissibility
when corroborating circumstances indicate a reduced need for the introduction of the hearsay
statement").
111. The Fourth Circuit has essentially changed the opening portion of residual excep-
tion Rule 804(b)(5) from "A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness . . ." to "a
statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but being corroborated
... " See Sonenshein, supra note 38, at 883 (noting that except for "declarations against
penal interest offered to exculpate a defendant, no requirement of corroboration exists as a
precondition to the admissibility of evidence under one of the enumerated exceptions. None
should therefore be required before admitting hearsay under the residual exceptions."). See
also Lewis, supra note 55, at 116-17 (noting that imposition of an added corroboration re-
quirement confuses the trustworthiness requirement).
112. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Develop-
ment, Application, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)s Penal Interest Exception, 69
GEO. L.J. 851, 980 (1981) (describing the penal interest corroboration requirement as
"unique among hearsay exceptions"); see also United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57, 63
(N.D. Ga. 1979), affld, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that except for Rule 804(b)(3),
other Rule 804 exceptions admitted without corroborating evidence).
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rowly fails to gain admission under a specific provision of the hear-
say rules. This problem occurred in Garner. Robinson's hearsay
was introduced under Rule 804(b)(5), which requires unavailability.
Although Robinson was present for cross-examination in front of
the trial jury, he would not answer all questions, testifying only that
he knew the defendants and that his grand jury testimony inculpat-
ing them was not accurate. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that "the
jury saw and heard Robinson on the witness stand. What they saw
and heard may have been of substantial assistance to the jury in
assessing the truthfulness of his grand jury testimony."' 3
In other words, although the exception requires unavailability,
his "availability" aided the hearsay's admission. This reasoning is
not sanctioned by Rule 804(b)(5). Rule 801(d)(1)(A), which bases
admissibility on the declarant's availability, seems more appropri-
ate. That Rule allows the admission of grand jury testimony when
the witness' trial testimony is inconsistent with the grand jury testi-
mony and the witness is subject to cross-examination.1 4 Its justifi-
cation is that the jury will see and hear the declarant and use these
perceptions in assessing the truth of the prior statements. 1 5
In Garner, most of Rule 801(d)(1)(A)'s elements were satisfied.
Robinson appeared at trial and proclaimed that his former testi-
mony was not correct, establishing the requisite inconsistency. The
prior statement was given under oath in a proceeding. The only
question is whether Robinson was subject to cross-examination at
trial. Since he refused to answer all questions on cross-examination,
this presented a difficult issue, one never addressed by the Court of
Appeals." 6 Robinson's prior statements apparently narrowly
missed satisfying the provision of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) requiring
cross-examination. How the residual exception should treat hear-
say that just fails to gain admission under a specific hearsay provi-
sion is the "near-miss" problem. 7
Examining the opening words of the catchalls provides insight
113. Garner, 574 F.2d at 1146.
114. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
115. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
116. See Garner, 574 F.2d at 1146.
117. See Sonenshein, supra note 38, at 885 (describing the near-miss situation); R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTBURG, supra note 2, at 504. Courts have split on how to handle the
near-miss. See Sonenshein, supra note 38, at 885-88 (collection of cases dealing with this
problem). Commentators have also split. Compare Note, supra note 61, at 1372 (concluding
that admission of near-miss hearsay violates the purpose of the residual exception) with Note,
Residual Hearsay Exceptions: Are They Really Trustworthy?, 44 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1125,
1133 (1978) (concluding that automatic exclusion of near-miss hearsay violates the purposes
of the Rules).
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into resolving this problem. Hearsay admission is sanctioned by
Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) only when the statement is "not specif-
ically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions ... ,,8 Con-
gress limited the residual exceptions to situations where the hearsay
is not "covered" by a specific exception; not to those situations
where hearsay was "not admissible" under another Rule." 9 "Cov-
ered" is a broader term. It implies thit hearsay, even though not
admissible under a specific exception, may still be within a Rule's
ambit. If the specific provision covers the proffered hearsay, it can-
not be admitted under a residual exception.
The proper approach to the "near-miss" problem is first to de-
termine whether the line drawn by a specific provision was meant to
keep inadmissible the proffered sort of "near-miss." 121 Only if the
answer is negative can the hearsay be considered under a residual
exception. 12 1 To ignore this analysis of the "near-miss" problem, as
Garner did,'22 subverts the drafters' work in enacting the specific
provisions of the hearsay article.
118. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (emphasis added).
119. House debates demonstrate the intent that courts rigidly adhere to the boundaries of
the hearsay exceptions. Representative Holtzman was concerned that the residual exception
"swallows up the [hearsay] rule and negates the work of both the House Judiciary Committee
and the conference committee." 120 CONG. REc. 40,893 (1974). She then raised the near-
miss problem, noting that the conference committee deleted a Senate proposal that would
have permitted police reports to be admitted as substantive evidence. Id. Holtzman was
concerned that police reports could be admitted under the residual exception if a trial judge
found comparable guarantees of trustworhiness. Id. at 40,895. Representative Dennis, a con-
ference committee member, replied that he did not believe admission of police reports was
ever possible. Id. He also stated that the use of police reports was removed in the conference
and that he could not "see how anybody could suggest that introducing such a report is
possible. . . under these rules. ... Id.
120. See Sonenshein, supra note 38, at 900-01 (suggesting that the "general purposes"
requirement of the residual exception should be used to handle the near-miss); R. LEMPERT
& S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 504 (concluding that "[t]he better policy is for the courts to
defer to legislative history where there is evidence that Congress or the Advisory Committee
deliberated over the lines they were drawing and to make their own judgments when there is
no evidence that a matter was considered").
121. Compare In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 444 F. Supp. 110,
113 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (court refused to admit former testimony under a residual exception,
stating, "[I]t is unlikely that Congress meant this exception to be used to circumvent its own
restriction of another exception.") with In re Screws Antitrust Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 1316
(D. Mass. 1981) (court admitted former testimony under a residual exception even though
the hearsay narrowly missed being admissible under the former testimony specific hearsay
exception Rule 804(b)(1)).
122. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 38, 804(b)(5)[01], at 804-183-84 (sug-
gesting that the admissibility of the grand jury testimony in Garner should have been ana-
lyzed under Rule 801(d)(l)(A)).
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VI. THE USE OF CORROBORATION As AN EQUIVALENT
CIRCUMSTANTIAL GUARANTEE OF
TRUSTWORTHINESS SUBVERTS HEARSAY'S
FUNDAMENTAL FRAMEWORK
Reversing the prosecutorial tables is a good way to assess where
the corroboration approach leads. The Fourth Circuit123 admits
grand jury testimony under a residual exception if it is corrobo-
rated."12 Corroboration is accepted as sufficient even if it does not
confirm all of the grand jury testimony, and the inculpatory por-
tions of the hearsay have not been corroborated. If the court is
truly using neutral principles and not merely justifying the hear-
say's admission because it believes a defendant guilty, the corrobo-
ration approach should apply equally to a defendant seeking to
introduce hearsay under a catchall exception.
Assume that a defendant is being tried for a robbery committed
by a lone gunman at three in the afternoon. Defense counsel gives
123. Other courts have relied on varying degrees of corroboration to determine admissi-
bility under the residual exceptions. See Sonenshein, supra note 38, at 876-77 n.55 (summa-
rizing cases); United States v. Ward, 552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 850
(1977) (hearsay statement held admissible under Rule 804(b)(5) solely because of strong cor-
roboration); United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 1978) ("trustworthiness of a
statement should be analyzed by evaluating not only facts corroborating the veracity of the
statement, but also the circumstances in which the declarant made the statement and the
incentive he had to speak truthfully or falsely.").
124. The Fourth Circuit has not specified what must be corroborated to justify admission
under the residual exceptions. Does corroboration have to establish the trustworthiness of
the declarant, the hearsay statement, or both? Cf. Tague, supra note 112, at 949-50 (discuss-
ing what must be corroborated under the penal interest exception's corroboration require-
ment). Most Fourth Circuit grand jury cases, however, merely rely upon the hearsay
corroboration. Corroboration of the declarant's personal trustworthiness was not required,
and the many indicators of their dubious credibility were ignored or deemed unimportant.
The credibility of confessed coconspirators who exchange benefits for their testimony or who
recant their prior assertions obviously is suspect.
Other Fourth Circuit cases, however, provide an interesting contrast. See, ag., United
States v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382 (4th Cir. 1980) (excluding statement proferred under Rule
803(24), reasoning that the statement lacked circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
where declarant was a "braggart"); United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983) (defendant sought to introduce exculpatory state-
ments of declarant; held, corroboration requirement of the penal interest exception not met,
although defendant produced much corroboration for the statements, since declarant's "long-
standing drug habits made her an inherently unreliable witness"); see also Comment, The
Corroboration Requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and United States v. Mac-
Donald: How Things Should Not Work, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 999, 1008 (1983) (summarizing
MacDonald); cf United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282, 284-85 (4th Cir. 1982) (grand jury
testimony admitted under Rule 804(b)(5), even though declarant "admitted to an expensive
heroin habit, which he financed through thefts.. ." and part of corroboration came from a
witness who admitted that she "was a heroin addict, supporting a $100 a day habit by
shoplifting").
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appropriate notice of his intention to use Rule 804(b)(5) and estab-
lishes that he served several subpoenas at declarant Smith's home.
Smith has not responded, and the attorney states that he has no
further knowledge of Smith's whereabouts.
At trial, defendant seeks to introduce a transcript of questions
by his attorney and answers by Smith made shortly after the de-
fendant's arrest. A notary, available for trial, administered an oath
to Smith. The stenographer who made the transcript swears to its
accuracy. The transcript contains Smith's assertions that defendant
was with him the entire day, the two did various activities together,
and could not have been the robber because the defendant and
Smith were watching television together at the time of the robbery.
The defense then produces the parish priest who confirms that
Smith and the defendant attended Mass together, as Smith asserted.
Bank records confirm Smith's assertion that the defendant depos-
ited a check, and the bank's surveillance film establishes that Smith
and the defendant were there together. People from a take-out-food
restaurant remember Smith and the defendant. Television station
logs corroborate Smith's description of the shows they watched to-
gether. A waitress testifies that Smith and the defendant ate dinner
together that night.
Are Smith's out-of-court declarations admissible? No specific
hearsay exception admits them, but defendant relies upon Rule
804(b)(5) as interpreted by the Fourth Circuit to justify their
introduction.
Under the Fourth Circuit's approach, this hearsay should be ad-
mitted. Its corroboration exceeds that of most grand jury testimony
admitted by the Fourth Circuit. Furthermore, unlike Garner,
nearly every aspect of the hearsay is confirmed. The corroboration
comes from an uninvolved person, not witnesses who were admit-
tedly involved in the crimes as were the Garner and Murphy declar-
ants. Admittedly, Smith may be the defendant's friend, but this
factor should not outweigh the corroboration in light of the Fourth
Circuit's acceptance of grand jury testimony produced by declar-
ants trying to reduce their criminal liabilities.
Of course, the corroboration for the portion that truly furnishes
the alibi-that Smith and defendant were watching television to-
gether at the time of the robbery-is weak and could have been
made up. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit's approach does
not require the incriminatory portions of the hearsay be corrobo-
rated, provided there is corroboration for other portions of the
statement. In this hypothetical, the defendant need not even cor-
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roborate the exculpatory portion of Smith's statement since he has
corroborated the remainder.
Indeed, the Fourth Circuit admits hearsay with much less cor-
roboration. Based upon the Thomas implication admitting hearsay
corroborated by other hearsay,125 the defendant could produce affi-
davits from other unavailable declarants each claiming to have
watched television with the defendant and the others at the relevant
time. If the affidavits contain corroborating details, all the hearsay
statements should be admitted under the Fourth Circuit's
approach.
Should this hearsay be admitted? The dangers of admitting it
are clear. Although much has been corroborated, the important
parts of the hearsay could easily have been fabricated. The corrobo-
ration does not change this possibility, and cross-examination can-
not explore the dangers of fabrication or insincerity. The
corroboration approach to establishing equivalent circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness is fundamentally wrong.
First, the finding required under the Fourth Circuit's approach
to the residual exception is very different from the factual conclu-
sion required for a specific hearsay exception. When deciding
whether hearsay falls within a traditional exception, the court only
decides whether the circumstances surrounding the statement fit the
exception's requirements. For example, before hearsay can be ad-
mitted as an excited utterance, the court has to decide whether the
out-of-court statement was made "under the stress" of an exciting
event.126 Dying declarations are admissible only if the court finds
that it was "made by a declarant while believing that his death was
imminent." 12 7 The court evaluating such statements decides ques-
tions that are different from ones the jury must ultimately deter-
mine. It rules on admissibility without ever considering whether it
believes what the excited or dying declarant said.
The corroboration decision is strikingly different. The court
does not examine the circumstances surrounding the making of the
assertion, but instead the amount and quality of confirming evi-
dence at trial. This evaluation, in effect, determines whether the
corroboration shows the hearsay to be true. By admitting an out-
of-court assertion under the corroboration standard, the court, in
effect, finds the declarant believable. This violates the fundamental
125. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
126. FED. R. EvID. 803(2).
127. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2).
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hearsay framework since judges are not authorized by the Rules to
admit or exclude evidence based upon their evaluation of its
truthfulness.
Furthermore, using corroboration to assess the trustworthiness
element required by Rule 804(b)(5) ignores the plain language of
that provision. The catchalls do not authorize the admission of
hearsay if it is as reliable as that admitted under a specific excep-
tion. If this were permitted, Rule 804(b)(5) would instead provide
"[s]tatements not covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but
just as trustworthy ...."I"
This revised language would effectively admit all hearsay, since
specific exceptions admit assertions without any pretense of reliabil-
ity. For example, former testimony has no inherent reliability. All
trial testimony is not trustworthy; a jury is commonly presented
with contradictory trial declarations. Cross-examination does not
invariably provide assurances that the testimony is reliable or trust-
worthy, but instead presents information to the jurors so they can
properly assess the testimony.129
Consequently, the admission of former testimony is not based
upon reliability; rather, it is admitted because the jury can evaluate
it nearly as well as in-court testimony. 130 If evidence offered under
Rule 804(b)(5) only has to be as trustworthy as former testimony,
the hearsay does not have to be trustworthy at all.13 1
128. See United States v. laconetti, 406 F. Supp. 554, 558 (E.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 540 F.2d 574
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (where Judge Weinstein summarized the
residual exceptions as "codify[ing] an open-ended exception for reliable and necessary hear-
say"). Judges interpreting the residual exceptions to admit hearsay on an ad hoc basis when
they determine the evidence is needed and trustworthy are arrogating unto themselves pre-
cisely the discretion Congress determined they were not to have. Recognizing that "some
judges do not have the discretion that others do," Senator Ervin commented during hearings
on the Rules that he "would rather have the rules say what is admissible rather than discre-
tionary." Federal Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1973).
129. J. MAGUIRE, supra note 12, at 147.
130. Contra MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 254, at 760 ("Cross-examina-
tion, oath, the solemnity of the occasion, and in the case of transcribed testimony the accu-
racy of reproduction of the words spoken, all combine to give former testimony a high degree
of credibility."); G. LILLY, supra note 7, § 74, at 251 (discussing the high trustworthiness of
former testimony); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURO, supra note 2, at 473 (asserting that former
testimony is very reliable).
131. See Burstein, supra note 109, at 275-76 (discussing the unique and inherently un-
truthful nature of former testimony due to its lack of guarantees of trustworthiness that
might arise from contemporaneity with the relevant events; lacks spontaneity because it is
elicited, allowing the questioner complete control over the scope of information provided;
advance preparation allows opportunity for testimony to be tailored to appear supported by
extrinsic evidence). But see R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 452 (reliability of
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Inherently unreliable hearsay is also admissible under Rule
803(4), which excepts statements made for the purpose of medical
diagnosis from the hearsay rule. 132 If hearsay offered under Rule
803(24) need only be as reliable as statements made to a doctor, the
hearsay may be unreliable.
The residual exceptions, however, do not authorize the admis-
sion of hearsay if it is as trustworthy as that admitted under a spe-
cific hearsay exception. Instead, they require circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those of a specific excep-
tion. Direct reliability is not the test; rather, circumstances that as-
sure reliability must be measured. "Equivalence" requires that the
circumstantial guarantees for residual hearsay be of the character
and have the same force, function, and effect as those for the specific
exceptions. The true starting point for this requirement, then, is an
examination of circumstances that insure the trustworthiness of
hearsay admitted under the specific exceptions.
VII. CIRCUMSTANTIAL GUARANTEES OF TRUSTWORTHINESS
FOR THE SPECIFIC HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
A. The Rule 804 Exceptions
1. Former Testimony
The first of the Rule 804 exceptions, the former testimony provi-
sion, ' 33 is not based on reliability. 131 Since its justification is some-
thing other than reliability, it has no circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness to serve as a residual exception point of reference.
2. Statements Under Belief of Impending Death
Dying declarations are justified as trustworthy by the "powerful
psychological pressures" present upon death. 3 This exception has
traditionally been based on "the assumption that one who knows he
former testimony justified by time lapse and corresponding loss of memory which occurs
between earlier hearing and trial).
132. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4). The similar common law exception excluded as unrelia-
ble statements to a physician consulted only for the purpose of enabling him to testify. The
rule rejected the limitation for the practical reason that, while the statements were not admis-
sible as substantive evidence, the jury would hear them anyway when the physician testified
about the bases of his opinion. Admitting them as hearsay eliminates the confusing jury
instruction that would otherwise result. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee
note.
133. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
134. See supra notes 129-31.
135. See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(2) advisory committee notes.
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is about to die is unlikely to lie." 136
The circumstance which guarantees trustworthiness exists at the
time of the hearsay utterance, 137 and that circumstance makes the
hearsay danger of insincerity less for this class of hearsay than for
other out-of-court assertions. Equivalence with this specific excep-
tion requires that the proffered Rule 804(b)(5) hearsay circum-
stances indicate that at the time of the declaration the hearsay
danger of insincerity was reduced or eliminated.13
3. Statements Against Interest
The statements against interest exception is justified by "the as-
sumption that persons do not make statements which are damaging
to themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true."
139
This rationale requires the speaker be aware when he speaks that
the remarks are against his interest." Thus, the circumstances ex-
isting at the time a statement against interest is uttered lessens the
insincerity danger.
4. Statements of Personal or Family History
The true justification for Rule 804(b)(4), which admits state-
136. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 482; Commonwealth v. Smith, 454
Pa. 515, 517-18, 314 A.2d 224, 225 (1973) (noting the reliability of a dying declaration based
upon the classic statement that no one "who is immediately going into the presence of his
Maker will do so with a lie upon his lips") (quoting Lush, L.J. in Regina v. Osman, 15 Cox
Cr. Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. 1881)).
137. G. LILLY, supra note 7, § 74, at 258. ("mT1he central feature of dying declarations-
and the condition that is essential to admissibility-is that the statement be made at a time
when the declarant has a settled expectation of death.").
138. The reliability of this guarantee has been questioned by commentators. See, eg., R.
LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at 484 (asserting that the exception is rooted more
in history than in reason). These criticisms may be important for determining whether the
dying declarations exception should exist. They also would be important concerns for the
residual exception if Rule 804(b)(5) authorized the admission of hearsay as reliable as that
admitted under a specific exception. If so, a court's determination that dying declarations
were not truly trustworthy would lead to the conclusion that unreliable statements could be
admitted under the catchall.
Rule 804(b)(5), however, does not admit hearsay as long as it is as reliable as a dying
declaration. An exploration of the true trustworthiness of dying declarations is, therefore,
not important here. Instead, the residual exceptions require that equivalence must be found
between the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness for the hearsay offered under the
residual exception and the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness for the dying declara-
tion. The proper question is not do the two assertions have comparable trustworthiness, but
are the guarantees for the two of the same type and quality.
139. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee note.
140. See Tague, supra note 112, at 907 ("The trustworthiness of a statement against
interest . . . is premised upon the declarant's recognizing the disserving nature of his state-
ment at the time he made it.").
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ments of personal or family history, is difficult to determine for two
reasons. First, the Rule eliminated a common law requirement for
the exception which assured the absence of a motive to falsify. The
common law required the pedigree statement be made ante litem
motam; that is, "before the origin of the controversy giving rise to
the litigation in which the statement is offered." '141 Second, the Ad-
visory Committee failed to state a justification for Rule 804(b)(4).
Hearsay statements of personal or family history may be justi-
fied by accuracy since pedigree statements are unlikely to be the
product of a faulty memory or perception.142 On the other hand,
this provision may exist because it "is a minor exception," and little
thought was given to it. 43 Or perhaps, even absent the ante litem
motam requirement, these statements are usually made without, or
at least with a lessened, hearsay danger of insincerity. Or the de-
clarant's special knowledge about family history matters may lessen
the chance of a mistaken assertion. Or perhaps, the justification is
not reliability, but merely necessity."4
If reliability is not the justification, this exception cannot be a
benchmark for the residual hearsay guarantees of trustworthiness.
If pedigree statements are deemed reliable, the circumstances guar-
anteeing trustworthiness are that, because of the special connection
between the declarant and the declaration's subject matter existing
when the statement is made, the hearsay is uttered with lessened or
eliminated memory, perception, or sincerity problems.
5. Summary of Rule 804 Circumstantial Guarantees of
Trustworthiness Characteristics
The Rule 804 circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness have
141. See In re Lewis' Estate, 121 Utah 385, 388, 242 P.2d 565, 567 (1952) (concluding
that hearsay is trustworthy because family members would know the truth of pedigree mat-
ters); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 322, at 902 (noting the accuracy of dis-
cussion of relatives as to family members).
142. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 322, at 902; see also FED. R. EVID.
804(b)(4) advisory committee note ("The general common law requirement that a declaration
in this area must have been made ante litam motam has been dropped, as bearing more
appropriately on weight than admissibility."); G. LILLY, supra note 7, § 78, at 269 n.88 (as-
serting that the statements of family history exception is an extension of the ancient docu-
ments exception).
143. D. BINDER, supra note 104, § 30.03, at 395.
144. Id (asserting that hearsay assertions of pedigree are excepted from the hearsay rule
because of necessity even though not substantially more trustworthy than hearsay assertions
in general); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 322, at 902 ("The general
difficulty of obtaining other evidence of family matters, reflected in the unavailability require-
ment, furnishes impetus for the hearsay exception.").
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two characteristics. First, these guarantees eliminate or lessen one
or more of the hearsay dangers. An assertion may be wrong be-
cause it is insincere, ambiguous, or based upon flawed memory or
perception. Hearsay is deemed unreliable because the jury cannot
properly evaluate these possible hearsay inaccuracies. If, however,
one or more of these concerns is eliminated or reduced for a hearsay
class, the chances of that hearsay being unreliable are less than for
hearsay generally. Consequently, good reason exists to admit that
particular hearsay class.
Second, the guarantees of trustworthiness for the Rule 804 ex-
ceptions exist at the time of the hearsay's utterance. The admissibil-
ity determination about a particular out-of-court assertion would be
the same the moment after it was made as at trial. This characteris-
tic is really a corollary of the first. Out-of-court assertions may be
introduced if the hearsay dangers are reduced. Since those dangers
exist when the assertion is made, the reduction in the hearsay dan-
gers must occur when the declaration is made. The guarantees of
trustworthiness must exist at the time of the hearsay's making.145
B. The Rule 803 Exceptions
The Rule 803 exceptions can conveniently be grouped into four
categories. "Of the 23 exceptions, 14 are based upon entries or the
absence of entries in documents; three exceptions are based upon
reputation; two exceptions provide for the admissibility of court
judgments; and four exceptions deal with evidence that frequently is
adduced orally." 146
1. Rule 803 Documentary Exceptions
The guarantees of trustworthiness for the business records ex-
ception, Rule 803(6), are representative of the guarantees for all of
the documentary exceptions. 47 The justification for the business
records exception "is the recognition that business entities rely
heavily upon regularly-kept records and, consequently, that there is
an organizational motivation to be thorough and accurate.'" 4 ' The
145. Stewart, supra note 12, at 24.
146. But see infra note 181 (discussing statements against penal interest offered to excul-
pate an accused).
147. See FED. R. EVID. 803(5)-(18) (documentary exceptions). Two of these provisions,
FED. R. EvID. 803(7) and (10), which provide for the admission of evidence to prove the
absence of entries in business and public records, are "probably not hearsay as defined in
Rule 801." FED. R. EVID. 803(7) advisory committee note.
148. G. LILLY, supra note 7, at § 68, at 236. See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
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circumstantial guarantees exist when the record is made 49 and
make it unlikely that the hearsay is insincere or the product of a
faulty memory or perception. 5 '
Three of the documentary exceptions- family records, ancient
documents, and recorded recollections' 5 '-cannot so easily be war-
ranted by extensions of the rationale for the business records excep-
tion. The justifications for Rule 803(13), the family records
provision, are a "long tradition" of admissibility' 52 and necessity,
rather than reliability.'53
The reliability rationale for the ancient documents exception,
Rule 803(16), is that the document was created prior to the exist-
ence of any motive to falsify arising out of the impending litigation,
and the written form reduces the possiblility of transmission er-
rors.' These justifications are consistent with the other excep-
note 46, § 306, at 872 ("[ln actual experience the entire business of the nation and many
activities function in reliance upon [business] records.").
149. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 306, at 872 (noting one of the
circumstances that assures business records' reliability is that "the entries must have been
made at or near the time of the transaction recorded").
150. The rationale for the business records exception similarly justifies FED. R. EVID.
803(8), the public records exception, and FED. R. EvID. 803(11), the religious organizations
records exception. Similar logic supports the existence of FED. R. EVID. 803(9) and (12), the
exceptions for records of vital statistics and marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. See
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 317, at 892-93 and § 319, at 896-97. FED. R.
EVID. 803(14) and (15), the exceptions for records affecting an interest in property and for
statements in documents affecting an interest in property, are based on a justification compa-
rable to the one for business records. See FED. R. EVID. 803(15) advisory committee note
("The circumstances under which dispositive documents are executed and the requirement
that the recital be germane to the purpose of the document are believed to be adequate guar-
antees of trustworthiness."). Accord D. BINDER, supra note 104, § 15.03, at 225.
Comparable reasoning also supports FED. R. EVID. 803(17) and (18), the exceptions for
market reports, commercial publications and learned treatises.
151. FED. R. EVID. 803(13),(16) and (5).
152. FED. IL EVID. 803(13) advisory committee note. See also MCCORMICK ON Evi-
DENCE, supra note 46, § 322, at 903 (stressing the traditional nature of this exception).
153. See D. BINDER, supra note 104, § 13.03, at 219 (noting that, although family
records such as inscriptions in a family Bible "may not be the most trustworthy evidence,
they are better than nothing"). But see M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 224 (justifying reliabil-
ity on the basis "that the family would not allow an untruthful entry or inscription to be
made, or to remain without protest").
154. M. GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 227. See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note
46, § 323, at 904 (citing reasons for the reliability of the ancient document exception); FED.
1L EVID. 803(16) advisory committee note (justifying the ancient document exception on the
basis that the "danger of mistake is minimized by authentication requirements, and age af-
fords assurance that the writing antedates the present controversy"). But see D. BINDER,
supra note 104, § 17.04, at 232-33 (asserting that necessity is the rationale for the ancient
documents hearsay exception, not reliability).
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tions, since the circumstances of the document's creation lessened
the hearsay dangers of ambiguity and insincerity.
The rationale for recorded recollections, Rule 803(5), is partially
based upon the reliability "inherent in a record made while events
were still fresh in mind and accurately reflecting them."1 5 Since
this guarantee existed when the hearsay was made, the danger of a
faulty memory is lessened. In addition, recorded recollections, sim-
ilar to former testimony, can be evaluated much like in-court testi-
mony. The witness must testify at trial and vouch for the accuracy
of the record, providing the jury with the opportunity to observe
appearance and demeanor. 156 "The witness is also subject to cross-
examination under oath concerning [the] prior recollection as
recorded."157
2. Rule 803 Reputation Exceptions
The reputation exceptions admit reliable hearsay by requiring a
broad interest in the subject matter of the reputation "so that it can
accurately be said that there is a high probability that the matter
underwent general scrutiny as the community reputation was
formed." '158 In order for reputation to come within this exception,
the "general scrutiny" must precede the formation of the commu-
nity opinion and be in existence when the hearsay is made. This
scrutiny produces reliability because it eliminates dependence upon
the individual's mental workings; the normal dangers of faulty per-
ception and memory are not present. The sincerity danger is elimi-
nated because a community's assertion, unlike an individual's, is not
affected by self-interest or a motive to fabricate. 59
3. Rule 803 Judgment Exceptions
Rule 803(23) excepts from the hearsay rule judgments as to per-
sonal, family or general history or boundaries. It is justified on
grounds almost identical to those that justify the reputation excep-
tions.1 60 No comparable rationale supports the reliability of Rule
155. FED. R. EVID. 803(5) advisory committee note.
156. D. BINDER, supra note 104, § 7.06, at 140.
157. Id.
158. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 324, at 906. See also FED. R. EVID.
803(19),(20), and (21) advisory committee note (basis of reliability of reputation exceptions).
159. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 25 (asserting that reputation exceptions are designed
to avoid dependence upon any single individual's mental processes; source of the reputation
must lie in a settled community acceptance which precludes reliance upon personal opinion
or rumor).
160. See FED. R. EVID. 803(23) advisory committee note (noting that verdicts were origi-
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803(22), the judgment of a previous conviction. The guarantees
vary depending upon whether the judgment is based on a guilty plea
or upon a trial verdict. A felony conviction resulting from a guilty
plea has reliability guarantees analogous to a statement against
interest.
Trial verdicts are reliable for three reasons. First, the convicted
person had a strong motivation to prove his innocence. 161 Second,
the constitutional standard for criminal trials, requiring proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt, lessens the possibility that the hearsay ver-
dict was based on faulty perceptions or memories. 62 Third, the
manner in which this hearsay is produced removes the danger that
the declarant spoke out of self-interest or with the motive to
fabricate. 163
4. Rule 803 Oral Evidence Exceptions
The four exceptions admitting evidence frequently adduced
orally all have trustworthiness guarantees. The reliability circum-
stance for both present sense impressions, Rule 803(1), and state-
ments of then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition,
Rule 803(3), is the absence of time between the declarant's percep-
tion and his assertion. 164 The immediacy of the subsequent state-
ment reduces the problems of sincerity and faulty memory. 165
The guarantee of trustworthiness for Rule 803(2), excited utter-
ances, is an event preceding the hearsay that is exciting enough to
still reflective capacity at the time of the assertion. The theory is
nally accepted as proof of reputation; shift to separate grounds of reliability proper "since the
process of inquiry, shifting, and scrutiny which is relied upon to render reputation reliable is
present in perhaps greater measure in the process of litigation").
161. See also FED. 1_ EVID. 803(22) advisory committee note (noting that convictions for
minor offenses are excluded from the Rule because the motivations to defend are often mini-
mal or nonexistent in comparison to felony charges).
162. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 318, at 894 (noting that a criminal
judgment represents significantly more reliable evidence than a civil judgment, because of the
heavy burden of proof in a criminal case).
163. Cf D. BINDER, supra note 104, § 24.04, at 281 (justifying the trial verdict exception
by considering a criminal conviction to "be a publicly recorded investigative finding that is
excepted to the hearsay rule as an entry in a public record", Rule 803(8)).
164. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee note (noting that Rule 803(3) "is
essentially a specialized application of" Rule 803(1)).
165. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee note (stating that the "substantial
contemporaneity of event and statement negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious
misrepresentation"); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 298, at 860 (commenting
that the report is safe from memory errors because it concerns observations made at the time
of the statement); see also G. LILLY, supra note 7, § 59, at 209 (substantial contemporaneity
requirement minimizes the dangers of deliberate misrepresentation and faded memory).
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that such a circumstance "produces utterances free of conscious
fabrication."' 16
6
Finally, the reliability circumstance for statements for purposes
of medical treatment, Rule 803(4), is the "patient's strong motiva-
tion to be truthful."' 6 7 The hearsay danger of sincerity is lessened
because of the patient's belief "that the effectiveness of treatment he
receives may largely depend upon the accuracy of the information
he provides the physician., 168
5. Summary of Rule 803 Circumstantial Guarantees of
Trustworthiness Characteristics
The Rule 803 circumstances guaranteeing reliability are very
much like those for the Rule 804 provisions. The circumstances
must exist when the hearsay is uttered and reduce or eliminate one
or more of the hearsay dangers.1 6
9
The residual hearsay exceptions admit hearsay if it has
equivalent circumstantial guarantees to the specific hearsay excep-
tions. The foregoing review of the specific exceptions illustrates
that the circumstances must exist at the time the residual hearsay
was uttered and reduce or eliminate the possibility that the out-of-
court assertion was the product of ambiguity or narrative difficul-
ties, insincerity, faulty memory, or flawed perceptions. If the guar-
antees for the hearsay offered under Rule 804(b)(5) or 803(24) do
not have these characteristics, the circumstantial guarantees are not
of equivalent type and quality as the guarantees of the specific ex-
ceptions, and the hearsay is not admissible. 70
166. FED. R. EvID. 803(2) advisory committee note.
167. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee note.
168. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 292, at 690. For a discussion of the
portion of the Rule 803(4) admitting statements made to a physician consulted only for the
purposes of diagnosis (and testimony of physician), see supra note 132 and accompanying
text.
169. Cf Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1786,
1796-97 (1980):
The reliability of hearsay is usually determined by examining the degree to which
believing the evidence requires unsupported reliance upon the declarant's four testi-
monial capacities: narration, sincerity, memory, and perception. If circumstances
indicate that no danger would result from reliance upon one or more of these capac-
ities, an exception is sometimes said to be warranted.
170. Justice Stewart suggested an interpretation of the catchalls which differs from the
corroboration approach and the one advocated here. See McKethan v. United States, 439
U.S. 936, 939 n.3 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (suggesting possible
intended purpose of Rule 804(b)(5) was to provide expansion of hearsay exception categories
rather than case-by-case exceptions); but see R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 2, at
505 (asserting that language of Rule 804(b)(5) and legislative intent make it plain that new
categories of hearsay exceptions not intended); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 38,
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VIII. ALL CIRCUMSTANCES REDUCING HEARSAY DANGERS
Do NOT JUSTIFY THE ADMISSION OF HEARSAY
UNDER A RESIDUAL EXCEPTION
The traditional hearsay framework makes hearsay presump-
tively inadmissible. When hearsay is admitted, it is justified by a
circumstantial guarantee that reduces one or more hearsay dangers.
The guarantees of trustworthiness that exist for all hearsay excep-
tions, however, cannot be sufficient to satisfy the residual excep-
tions; otherwise the hearsay prohibition will vanish.
United States v. Williams is illustrative. 171 Williams involved a
tax fraud prosecution. George Bush, an employee of the defend-
ant's firm, gave a signed, pretrial affidavit to Internal Revenue
agents. Bush's trial testimony differed from his affidavit. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the affidavit's admission under Rule 803(24), find-
ing numerous circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Bush
admitted making the statement willingly, making alterations to en-
sure its "correctness." 172 "The affidavit was made closer in time to
the actual events than was the trial testimony; hence the possibility
of lost recollection was reduced." 173 Finally, since Bush testified,
the jury could assess his demeanor.
This last factor is not a trustworthiness guarantee. The jury's
observation of Bush's trial testimony supports the conclusion that
they could evaluate his hearsay better than an unavailable declar-
ant's hearsay. The jury's opportunity to assess the demeanor of an
in-court declarant, however, does not make the former statements
reliable and should not be considered in assessing admissibility
under a residual exception.
Similarly, the alterations made to the affidavit did not necessar-
ily insure its accuracy. The changes do not guarantee that Bush
remembered or perceived the affidavit's subject matter correctly or
803(24)[01], at 803-381-83 (rejecting Justice Stewart's suggestion). Creation of new classes of
admissible hearsay, as Justice Stewart suggested, results in major changes in the hearsay rule,
and the drafters intended that only Congress should have this power. See S. REP. No. 1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 7051, 7067
("[R]esidual exceptions are not meant to authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule
.... Such major revisions are best accomplished by legislative actions.").
The rejection of Justice Stewart's "expansion of hearsay categories" approach to Rule
804(b)(5) lends additional support to this Article's assertion that the Fourth Circuit's ap-
proach is wrong. That court has, in effect, created a new category of admissible hearsay-the
category of corroborated grand jury testimony.
171. 573 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1978).
172. Id. at 288.
173. Id.
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that he did not intend to deceive the IRS. Instead, the alterations
merely show that the affidavit accurately recorded what he meant to
tell the agents, and that the hearsay was correctly reported to the
jury. 1 74  Similarly, his testimony that he made the former statement
does not insure the statement's reliability, but only that the hearsay
statement was made. These two factors fail to separate this hearsay
from hearsay generally. Our trial system, through authentication
rules, cross-examination, oath, and demeanor of the in-court wit-
ness reporting the hearsay, always presents the jury with informa-
tion to determine whether the hearsay was actually made and
correctly reported.
The court's reasoning that this hearsay had a reduced possibility
of lost recollection compared to later trial testimony ignores the fact
that hearsay inevitably occurs closer to the event it describes than
trial testimony. The hearsay rule will vanish if this factor justifies
admission under a residual exception.
Finally, the court noted the affidavit was made willingly. A
statement made involuntarily is less reliable than one made without
coercion; however, this circumstance exists for hearsay generally,
since out-of-court assertions are usually voluntary.
The circumstances relied upon in Williams exist for nearly all
hearsay. This approach to the residual exceptions would lead to
nearly routine hearsay admission.'75 The circumstances reducing
the hearsay dangers cannot be the same that exist for almost all
hearsay.
Similarly, it is incorrect to rely solely on guarantees that are also
present for a broad range of inadmissible hearsay. A court's finding
of the requisite circumstantial guarantees allowing the introduction
of a category of out-of-court statements that the hearsay rule was
meant to ban must be incorrect. 76 Finally, the residual hearsay
174. Compare United States v. Hinkson, 632 F.2d 382, 385 (4th Cir. 1980) (correctly
holding that the trustworthiness requirement or reliability of Rule 803(24) relates to the cred-
ibility of the extrajudicial declarant and not that of the in-court witness) with United States v.
Lyon, 567 F.2d 777 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 435 U.S. 918 (1978) (holding the admission of an
FBI interview transcript proper under Rule 804(b)(5) based upon trustworthiness guaranteed
by FBI agent's detailed testimony regarding how he took and transcribed the statement).
175. The stated Rule 803(24) reliability factors coupled with the jury's opportunity to
observe the cross-examination and demeanor of the declarant at trial still results in improper
hearsay admission. In effect, Williams stands for the proposition that every time the declar-
ant testifies at trial and admits making the out-of-court assertion, the hearsay is admissible.
This negates the Rules' restrictions on the substantive admission of prior statements. The
Williams court's interpretation of the residual exceptions effectively works a major change in
the hearsay framework.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (neces-
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guarantees must not only be different from those for hearsay gener-
ally or for a broad range of inadmissible hearsay; they must have
equivalent force to the guarantees of a specific exception. The guar-
antees for residual hearsay must not only reduce the hearsay dan-
gers, they must reduce them to the same extent as a specific
exception.
Consequently, hearsay admission is not justified by every reduc-
tion of hearsay dangers. The Rules consistently indicate that not
every reduction suffices to admit hearsay. For example, an oath
may lessen the danger of insincerity.177 However, this reduction
will not, by itself, suffice to admit the hearsay. The former testi-
mony exception178 and the inconsistent statement exclusion 179 both
impose requirements in addition to the oath.1 80
Similarly, hearsay falling just outside the time necessary to qual-
ify as a present sense impression may present a lesser chance that
the statement was produced by a faulty memory than hearsay gen-
erally. This reduction, by itself, however, is insufficient justification
to admit an out-of-court assertion. An exception for such state-
ments of recent perception was considered and rejected by
sary guarantees under Rule 804(b)(5) for admission of a murdered witness' grand jury testi-
mony found because witness had no motive to testify falsely, was not being investigated and
not given immunity, took an oath and had firsthand knowledge and reaffirmed and never
recanted his story; corroboration existed for his testimony).
The Mastrangelo court misinterpreted the Rule 804(b)(5) circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness requirement. The corroboration and reaffirmation were not circumstances
that reduced any hearsay danger when the statement was made. Firsthand knowledge is a
requisite for the admission of hearsay; its presence was not a circumstance reducing hearsay
dangers. See McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 247, at 731 n.3 (hearsay declar-
ants, like lay witnesses, generally must also have personal knowledge); see also, FED. R.
EVID. 602 (requiring a lay witness to have firsthand knowledge of the events testified to). The
absence of a motive to fabricate and the peijury possibility may reduce the hearsay dangers.
However, although these two factors may not exist for most hearsay, they are present for
nearly all grand jury testimony. Every grand jury witness testifies under oath, few are partici-
pants in the crime, few are offered immunity, and few have an apparent reason to lie. The
Mastrangelo circumstances would admit most grand jury testimony under Rule 804(b)(5).
177. An acknowledged minority view, espoused by some commentators, is that the oath
has some effect on reducing the hearsay dangers. See Stewart, supra note 12, at 22-23 (com-
menting that sworn testimony is more accurate than unsworn testimony because the witness
probably exercises greater caution when under oath); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra
note 2, at 352 n.l (contending that the oath's value should not be discounted in the absence
of empirical evidence of its ineffectiveness in promoting reliable testimony).
178. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
179. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
180. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1) advisory committee note (mere presence of oath has
never been regarded as sufficient to remove a statement from the hearsay category).
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Congress.'s
IX. THE PROPER INTERPRETATION OF EQUIVALENT
CIRCUMSTANTIAL GUARANTEES OF
TRUSTWORTHINESS
Four analytical steps must be taken to satisfy a residual hearsay
exception's equivalent circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness
requirement.
First, the court must isolate the circumstances existing when the
hearsay was made.
Second, the court must decide whether those circumstances re-
duce some or all of the hearsay dangers.
Third, the court must determine that these circumstances do not
exist for all hearsay or for a broad range of inadmissible hearsay.
181. Proposed Rule 804(b)(2), an unenacted hearsay exception requiring unavailability of
the declarant, provided for the admission of
a statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in investigating,
litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event or
condition recently perceived by the declarant, made in good faith, not in contempla-
tion of pending or anticipated litigation in which he was interested, and while his
recollection was clear.
FED. R. EVID. (Revised Draft), 51 F.R.D. 315, 438 (1971).
The House Judiciary Committee deleted the provision because it "did not believe that
statements of the type referred to bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness to justify ad-
missibility." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7079. But see United States v. Van Lufcins, 676 F.2d 1189 (8th
Cir. 1982) (recent perceptions made by jail assault victim to his sister admitted under Rule
804(b)(5); only indicia of reliability was short time period between incident and statement).
The Rules are replete with other examples where hearsay admission is not sufficiently
justified by every reduction of the hearsay dangers. Business records are not admissible, even
though circumstances surrounding their making may reduce the hearsay dangers if "the
source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trust-
worthiness." See FED. R. EvID. 803(6). Similarly, statements against penal interests reduce
hearsay dangers, but Rule 804(b)(3) provides that this reduction may not always justify ad-
mission. Consequently, the Rule makes statements exculpating an accused inadmissible "un-
less corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." See
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
This is the only provision where the admissibility decision at trial would not necessarily
be the same as the moment after the hearsay's utterance. This corroboration requirement,
however, is not the same circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness as those found in the
other hearsay exceptions. Concern about the unreliability of exculpatory statements led the
drafters to impose an additional and different requirement from the normal guarantees of
trustworthiness. See Tague, supra note 112, at 866-92 (full discussion of legislative history of
corroboration provision); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 46, § 298, at 862 (noting
that the Rule 804(b)(3) corroboration requirement, which "represents a radical departure
from the general pattern of exceptions to the hearsay rule," was incorporated by the Advisory
Committee to increase the acceptability of admission of statements against penal interest).
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Fourth, the court must decide whether the reduction in the dan-
gers is comparable to that for a specific exception.
These standards eliminate the subversion of the Rules' hearsay
framework produced by the corroboration approach to the residual
exceptions. They remove the judge's belief about the hearsay's
truth or the strength of a party's case from consideration. The
judge's decision on the hearsay's admissibility under a residual ex-
ception will be similar to that for any other hearsay ruling.
These standards defer to the drafters' decisions that some cir-
cumstances do not lessen the dangers sufficient to justify the admis-
sion of hearsay. The years of analysis that resulted in the common
law exceptions and the drafters' extensive consideration of both that
common law and the scholarly comments about it, mean that many
decisions about circumstances that reduce the dangers have already
been made. Since the residual exceptions will be limited to that
small area where no determination about circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness already exists, the residual exceptions will be
confined to rare and exceptional cases. 182 The proposed standards
eliminate the inevitable conflict between the more probative and
trustworthiness elements of the catchalls produced by the corrobo-
ration approach.1 83 They do not rely on trial evidence that tends to
make the hearsay less necessary.
The standards are superior to the corroboration approach be-
cause they provide articulable guidelines to aid the trial judge's dis-
cretion. Since judges will draw on the specific exceptions'
comparable circumstantial guarantees, including accumulated case
experience and commentators' knowledge, the role of judicial bias
will decrease and the predictability and certainty of decisions will
increase. Similarly, use of the proposed standards should lead the
trial judge to articulate the reasons for a ruling, and articulated,
reasoned decisions should lead to more uniform and predictable
residual hearsay rulings.
Furthermore, the proposed standards satisfy the language of the
residual exceptions and operate within the traditional hearsay
framework. They insure equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness between residual hearsay and the specific excep-
tions. The standards properly interpret the residual hearsay Rules'
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
182. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
1986]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
requirement. 184
X. THE PROPER APPLICATION OF THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTIONS
TO THE GRAND JURY CASES
The proposed standards' application to the Fourth Circuit's
grand jury cases would have resulted in the inadmissibility of the
hearsay in all but United States v. West. l"' In the other cases, no
circumstances existed when the grand jury statements were made
that sufficiently reduced the hearsay dangers to justify the admis-
sion under Rule 804(b)(5). 8 6 The only circumstance guaranteeing
reliability when the hearsay was uttered was an oath administered
to the declarants. The Rules clearly indicate that an oath, by itself,
184. Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961),
is a good test for the proposed standards. Dallas County was the impetus for the residual
exceptions, Sonenshein, supra note 38, at 868, and both the Senate and the Advisory Commit-
tee cited the case as an example of the catchalls' intended operation. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7066; FED. R.
EVID. 803(24) advisory committee note.
In 1957, the clock tower of the Dallas County courthouse in Selma, Alabama, collapsed.
Dallas County, 286 F.2d at 390. Several people reported that the tower had recently been
struck by lightning and charred wood was found in the debris. Id Dallas County sought to
collect on its policies which insured against losses from fire and lightning. Id. The insurance
companies refused to pay, maintaining that the tower plummeted because of structural weak-
nesses. Id. In the resulting trial, the insurers attempted to prove that the charred wood was
aged by introducing a copy of an unsigned, June 9, 1901, Selma newspaper article describing
a fire that morning in the dome of the courthouse. Id.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the newspaper article's admission. After determining the hear-
say's introduction was necessary because of the unlikelihood of producing a witness with an
accurate memory of the fifty-year-old events, the court found the requisite circumstances of
trustworthiness in the newspaper reporter's lack of "motive to falsify, and a false report
would have subjected the newspaper and him to embarrassment in the community. The
usual dangers inherent in hearsay evidence, such as lack of memory, faulty narration, intent
to influence the court proceedings, and plain lack of truthfulness are not present here." Id. at
397. Analyzed under the proposed standards, the hearsay had circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness because the circumstances existing when it was uttered reduced or eliminated
hearsay dangers. These circumstances did not exist for hearsay generally. In effect, the court
concluded that the reductions in the hearsay dangers were at least as great as for the other
hearsay exceptions. Significantly, the Dallas County court determined the newspaper article's
admissibility without using corroboration.
185. 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978).
186. Cf. United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that Fourth
Circuit cases held corroborated grand jury transcripts admissible hearsay under Rule
804(b)(5) because "grand jury proceedings, with their attendant formalities--official record-
ing of testimony, protection against witness abuse, and official supervision- afford greater
protection for the accuracy of the truthfinding process than does the taking of exparte affida-
vits"). But see Note, The Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony Under 804(b)(5): A Two-
Test Proposal, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1446 (1983) (stating that "modern grand jury
procedural practices make the reliability of grand jury testimony highly suspect").
[Vol. 36:431
SUBVERSION OF HEARSAY RULE
is an insufficient trustworthiness guarantee. 18 7
West's grand jury testimony should have been admitted. The
testimony consisted of written statements taken from Brown imme-
diately after the drug transactions occurred.18 8 Brown had a signifi-
cant stake in giving truthful statements. He was fully aware that
any fabrications would be immediately disclosed because the drug
enforcement agents recorded, photographed and observed the drug
transactions. Furthermore, he cooperated in exchange for lesser
punishment for a prior conviction.' 9 Any insincerity by Brown
was strongly against his penal interest.
These circumstances existed when the statements were made, re-
ducing or eliminating the hearsay danger of insincerity. They do
not exist for hearsay generally or for a broad range of inadmissible
hearsay. The circumstances reducing the insincerity danger are
comparable to those of a specific hearsay exception. Indeed, the
circumstantial guarantees of this hearsay are akin to a statement
against interest. The standards for determining equivalent circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness were satisfied, and the hear-
say was properly admissible under Rule 804(b)(5).
XI. CONCLUSION
The residual exceptions were enacted to allow for the admission
of exceptional hearsay not covered by a specific exception, but that
still fits within the traditional framework for hearsay exceptions.
The approach to the residual exceptions that relies on hearsay cor-
roboration subverts the framework adopted in the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The proper approach, which preserves the Rules' hear-
say structure, uses four standards to examine whether the circum-
stances existing when the hearsay was uttered reduced the hearsay
dangers sufficiently to justify the admission of the out-of-court
statement.
187. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
188. West, 574 F.2d at 1134. See supra text accompanying note 60.
189. West, 574 F.2d at 1135. See supra note 60.
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